Foreign Policy Voting in the Brazilian Federal Senate: Do senators delegate to the Executive?

Robert McDonnell

April 2016

Abstract

This paper seeks to contribute to the literature on foreign policy voting behaviour in the Brazilian houses of legislature. To that end, nominal voting records for the Federal Senate are analysed, with ideal points created using the Bayesian Item-Response Theory (IRT) model. The discrimination parameter of the IRT model is employed to explore the idea that Brazilian legislators delegate/abdicate to the Executive; the analysis finds strong support for this hypothesis, depending on the exact foreign policy theme. A variant of a dynamic Bayesian IRT theme is then used to explore ideal points for the senators on various issues, including foreign policy themes. The results of this analysis support the findings of the earlier part – senators *do* indeed delegate to the Executive on matters of diplomacy, security, the military and international relations.

Latin America as a region has been the focus of increasing numbers of quantitative studies devoted to legislative politics, but to a lesser degree foreign policy, and to a lesser degree again, ideal point analyses of both themes, which remain rare (Ribeiro, 2012, p.12). We know little about why Brazilian senators vote the way they do on foreign policy matters. In fact, the Senate as a whole is a very understudied

institution, certainly compared to the Chamber of Deputies. With regard to the latter, the literature has been quite consistent: the significant powers of the Brazilian president induce a government–opposition dynamic to nominal voting behaviour, mediated through party leaders who keep their members in line. Considering foreign policy, studies have found no difference between voting behaviour on foreign policy issues and other themes, meaning that foreign policy too appears determined by this government–opposition dynamic. In this paper, I utilise an adaptation of a Bayesian Dynamic Item-Response Theory (IRT) model to estimate ideal points for senators on various themes, including foreign policy themes, which allows us to study their voting behaviour on each of these themes. In this way, foreign policy can be directly compared to domestic policy using comparable ideal points; it also allows us to compare sub-themes of foreign policy to one another. I also use the 'discrimination' parameter of the (non-dynamic) IRT model to explore how foreign policy votes cause (or not) a separation among the senators in the policy space. In substantive terms, this means that we can explore and discuss the hypothesis that Brazilian legislators have no interest in foreign policy and thus delegate to the Executive in this area. The analysis shows that senators *do* delegate to the Executive on foreign policy issues, although the issues in question matter. I also show that there is little basis on which to argue that domestic policy is voted on in the same manner as foreign policy. This paper is structured as follows. First, I briefly review the literature on this and related topics, and then methodology is discussed. Results are then presented and discussion follows.

Although foreign policy votes do not usually occur in large numbers in either of the Brazilian houses of legislature (Oliveira, 2013), there are good reasons to study the particular connection between the Federal Senate and foreign policies instead of the Chamber of Deputies. Firstly, from the point of view

of International Political Economy (IPE) theories, senators are much more likely to act as a conduit for domestic pressures for a variety of reasons. This is because senators are high profile politicians, counting among their number government ministers, presidential candidates and even a former president (Collor), which is important for two reasons. First, the formulation of Brazilian foreign policy is insular in nature – it has historically been the remit of the foreign ministry, Itamaraty, and when not under Itamaraty influence, comes under the direction of the Executive, a 'presidential diplomacy' style that grew under the Cardoso and Lula years (Cason and Power, 2009). There are also those in the literature who see present-day Brazilian foreign policy as being almost *completely* dictated by the Executive, given the high level of Executive control over Itamaraty and the presidential diplomacy style of the Executives (Malamud, 2005; Cason and Power, 2009). However, there are others who disagree. Helfand (1999) quotes the president of the National Agriculture Confederation (*Confederação Nacional da Agricultura*) as saying: "It was much easier before. It was enough to go to the executive branch and get what you wanted. Now you have to go to the executive first, then to Congress, and finally to the judiciary" (1999, p.25). Given that networks of influence in Brazil have been shaped by this style of personal contacts among high-level players (Schneider, 1997; Helfand, 1999), it is reasonable to assume that only politicians who already have these high-level connections, such as former government ministers, would be in a position to influence foreign policy formulation in the insulated Itamaraty or the Executive. Hence, any prospective pressure groups are more likely to target senators than deputies, although there may of course be individuals in both houses who are more likely to be targets of pressure groups.

Secondly, although deputies may have their electoral strongholds (Ames, 1995), there is a huge number of them per state. Senators, on the other hand, only number three per state, regardless of the size of

the state, which increases their visibility hugely compared to deputies, making it reasonable to assume that higher-profile senators are more likely to be held accountable for their votes than the multitude of lower-profile deputies (although party membership may be a mental short-cut for voters in relation to deputies).

Secondly, the Senate holds particular powers in the area, which renders it a more interesting case for foreign policy than the Chamber. It is notable that the Brazilian Senate has the power to authorize any external credit proposal by municipalities and states, further strengthening the link between senator constituencies, senators, and the world at large, and, indeed, is the only Senate in the world to have this power. More than 80% of the resolutions emitted by the Senate between 1989 and 1998 referred to the authorization or restructuring of the debt of different levels of government and public companies (Neiva, 2008, p.47). During a period of serious economic restructuring[1], the importance of the role played by the Senate was clear to see, and this is one of the reasons that Neiva (2008) ranks the Brazilian Senate as one of the most powerful in the world. Indeed, Neiva explicitly comments on the 'privileged' role of the Senate with regard to matters of the state:

> "[This data] reinforces the privileged role of the Senate on topics that I will call 'state-related'. As can be observed [...], themes of an economic nature, those relative to the Judiciary and international relations receive more attention in the Upper House, whereas the Lower House is more concerned with themes related to the environment, human rights and agriculture." (Neiva, 2008, p.48, author's translation)

Other powers of the Senate include the exclusive right to nominate the directors and the president of the Central Bank and the right to approve the ministers of the *Tribunal das Contas*. Since the president

---

[1]This was the era of the *Plano Real* and all its concomitant economic re-organization. See, for example, Flynn (1996).

has the exclusive right to issue budgetary proposals, these powers are important counter-weights to executive power when it comes to the finances and the economy of the state. The above are also key reasons why, if we are to observe any attempts at domestic influence on foreign policy passing through the houses of legislature, it will be in the Senate as opposed to the Chamber.

The mechanism that sees legislators as conduits for domestic pressures seeking to influence policy output has been commonly assumed and discussed in the IPE literature (see, for example: Rogowski, 1989; Milner, 1997; Simmons, 1997; Sklair, 1997; Broz and Frieden, 2001; Mansfield et al., 2002; Frieden, 1988). This point of view is related to other theoretical standpoints that explain how leaders rely on a particular set of supporters regardless of the type of polity (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003); are responsive to the median elector in a democracy (Black, 1948; Downs, 1957), and simultaneously use both domestic-level and international-level strategies for political gain (Putnam, 1988). A basic, and very much simplified, example of the legislator-as-conduit is the following: imagine a legislator, in whose constituency lies an ineffective industry threatened by a potential international agreement that proposes liberalising trade. It is reasonable to expect that this legislator would face pressure from groups or individuals linked to the threatened industry to vote against such an agreement should it be put to a vote, while at the same time the legislator also faces pressure from his/her party or government, as well as other lobbying groups, not to mention his/her personal feelings on the matter. This simple example captures the essence of the idea of the legislature as a conduit for domestic pressure with regard to the international political economy. Given the existence of nominal voting records, we can test hypotheses on the existence of such a mechanism by using such voting records, including focusing on just foreign-policy related votes, as has been done many times in the literature (e.g. Broz, 2005; Milner and Tingley, 2011; Broz and Hawes, 2006; Milner and Tingley, 2009).

There is also another aspect to foreign policy issues and nominal votes, which concerns the role of the Executive. It is often thought that individual legislators are more parochial than Executives since the latter have a larger, national electoral base, rather than the narrower electoral bases of legislators (Clinton et al., 2013, p.8).[2] However, constituency size has not been found to be a powerful predictor of legislator behaviour, at least concerning trade policy (Karol, 2007). There is also a belief that Executives are more dominant in the area of foreign policies. Often termed the 'Two Presidents Thesis' (Wildavsky, 1966) in the US literature, this theory enjoyed early empirical support but it is now argued that the effect has waned as the US Congress has become more active and more partisan in international affairs (Fleisher et al., 2000).

An important feature of this theory is that legislators are absent in some way from the formulation of foreign policies. This aspect, when noted empirically in the United States, was often put down to ideas of bipartisanship of the legislature in the arena of foreign policy; that is to say, legislators displayed an alignment of preferences in the area, delegating to the Executive. The effect was strongest when legislators felt united in the face of some kind of foreign threat, such as Communism (McCormick and Wittkopf, 1990). However, ideas of bipartisanship do not mean that legislators do not invest in foreign policies (Milner and Tingley, 2015). In Latin America, and particularly in Brazil, the debate over bipartisanship in foreign policy themes has been one of the key debates in the analysis of Brazilian foreign policy and has focused on whether the houses of legislature abdicate or delegate to the Executive. Some studies of Brazilian legislative activity have found evidence of delegation (Figueiredo and Limongi, 2000, p.156), although this was on a particular issue (the *Plano Real*, Cardoso's economic stabilization plan), while others have argued that, because domestic policy and foreign policy

---

[2]There are studies that detail the efforts of interest groups in lobbying the US Executive, and so it cannot be assumed that the president *always* has a national interest and a broader constituency, or that he/she is actually insulated from interest group pressure (Orman, 1988).

are treated the same by legislators (Onuki et al., 2009; Ribeiro, 2012), it cannot be the case that foreign policy themes provoke delegation, since this would mean that Brazilian legislators delegate/abdicate on *all* themes. Jokes about legislative laziness aside, this would seem unlikely *prima facie*.

Although this debate is more commonly framed as 'abdication vs. delegation' (e.g. Lemos, 2010), in the roll-call context, both ideas predict similar behaviour in terms of vote outcomes: 'delegation' assumes that the senators lack either informational or institutional capability in foreign policy matters and so delegate to the more capable and informed Executive by voting *en masse* for presidential foreign policy initiatives; 'abdication' assumes the same non-involvement, albeit with a more negative connotation, both ending in the same voting outcome (i.e. passively supporting the Executive). The main difference lies in behaviour observed outside of nominal voting: behaviour relating to oversight (such as the nomination of heads of diplomatic missions), perception (as gleaned from surveys of legislators), committee and budget output (Lemos, 2010); other behaviours may be observed in reservations stated and heated debate (Diniz, 2012). The revealed preferences that we obtain from nominal voting behaviour do not allow us the fine distinction between abdication and delegation; they are rolled into one, as the senators will either display behaviour typical of abdication/delegation on foreign policy votes (indifference) or will not. I will use the term 'delegate' to refer to this debate; as we cannot separate the two notions using nominal voting only, I prefer the less judgemental phrase.

Data and Methods

Nominal votes from the CEBRAP database[3], which were modified and expanded to suit the needs of the research are the main source of data for this analysis. (Further information was taken from the Senado

---

[3]Centro Brasileiro de Análise e Planejamento, http://cebrap.org.br/v3/.

Federal website.[4]) A key part of this study is the categorization of votes into thematic areas, principally to facilitate the comparison of foreign-policy-related proposals to others. Legislative proposals are often complex and multi-faceted, and dividing them into categories based on their content naturally raises questions about the legitimacy of such a method. Some proposals are simple to categorise in a typology because they only deal with one specific issue. Others, principally the *Medida Provisórias* emitted by the Executive, are often large pieces of legislation that encompass many issue areas and cover many themes. There are two main methods employed in the literature to code vote content, one subjective, the other not. The subjective process is termed by Lauderdale and Clark (2014) as 'expert coding' and involves the labelling of votes, based on content, by an expert in the area. The second method available is a topic model in which the content of the votes may be learned by a computer algorithm through a supervised or unsupervised process (Lauderdale and Clark, 2014; Gerrish and Blei, 2012, 2011). This second method was tried, using the *indexação* of the votes, web-scraped from the website of the Senate. However, the terms in the *indexação* are repeated heavily, with the vast majority being related to administration. This resulted in analyses that either ended up ignoring foreign policy themes (as the terms were so rare) or required such manual pruning of terms that them 'automated' process ended up being similar to expert coding. Hence, although I do not claim to be an expert, expert coding was the method used to label votes based on their content.

In order to do this, I exploited a source of information not often used in roll-call analysis in Brazil. Each proposal contains a *justificação* written by the legislator in order to explain the purpose of the legislation and its hoped-for benefits, and calling for the support of colleagues. These justifications may be found (for the years after 2003 or so) on the website of the Senate, in pdf format.

---

[4]http://www12.senado.leg.br/hpsenado

Classifying the votes using these justifications is usually a very straight-forward process, given that the purpose of the legislation is explicitly spelled out in the document. For the years before 2003, the justification can be usually be found in the official diary, by tracing the date of the nominal vote and the Senate number associated with the proposal.[5] Executive proposals, and in particular the MPVs, contain a section where the purpose of the proposed legislation is spelt out (and is addressed to the president). Because of the multi-faceted nature of the these proposals, I was cautious in designating any of them as foreign policy related or not. Only if the important parts of the proposal were related to foreign policy, or if the majority of the proposed legislation was related to foreign policy, was an Executive proposal coded as such. Additionally, many foreign policy proposals (of any type) are often not labelled as such in the *Ementa* provided on the Senate website, which forms the content of the vote in the CEBRAP database. Many votes have an *Ementa* of the sort, "*Altera o artigo X da Lei. Numero X*", which is to say that the actual content is very often *only* visible by checking the *justificação*. The use of these justifications has allowed me to include many more votes in the analysis of foreign policy voting than has previously been done in the literature. In terms of the coding of the proposals into topics, the use of these topics obviously simplifies reality. When coding the topics, I originally ended up with almost 500 topics, which is realistic for legislative activity but totally unwieldy for analysis. I eventually reduced this down to just over thirty topics.

In terms of the overall quantity of votes, **Table 1** shows that foreign policy votes only constitute some 12% of the total. It is also well-known that a lot of foreign policy votes come from the Executive

---

[5]There are links provided on the Senate website in the *tramitação* part of the page associated with the proposal, but very often these links are faulty, indeed frequently the proposal had to be traced manually by scanning through the *Diário Oficial* because the wrong page numbers or dates are provided on the Senate website. Since this research was conducted, the Senate website (http://www12.senado.leg.br/hpsenado) has been overhauled and redesigned. The links seem to have been improved, and the documents that were originally in the *tramitação* section can be found in the *Documentos* section of the landing page when a search is done for a particular proposal. However, searches for justifications made before 2003 need to be done in the *Diário Oficial*, but the links from the *tramitação* section to the relevant page in the diary no longer appear, making the process more difficult now.

branch, nevertheless, as **Table 2** shows, it is not the only source of foreign-policy themed proposals.

Table 1: Vote totals in the Senate by foreign policy theme, 1989-2010.

Domestic	Foreign Policy	Security	Trade	Diplomacy	Finance	Loans
1253	155	36	62	28	14	15

Table 2: Foreign Policy themed proposals by proposer, 1989-2010.

	Executive	Coalition	Commission	Opposition	Other
Security	18	4	0	3	11
Trade	30	15	0	17	0
Diplomacy	1	10	10	9	7
Finance	5	2	5	2	0
Loans	3	1	9	0	2

The Spatial Voting Model

Nominal voting data are most often analysed in conjunction with the spatial voting model (SVM). As applied to legislative voting, the model assumes a policy space, usually of one or two dimensions, in which legislators choose a 'Yes' or 'No' alternative (or may simply abstain) on a policy proposal, voting for whatever proposal is closest to their preferred policy. Choosing 'Yes' or 'No' aligns the legislator with others who vote the same way, and distances him/her from those who vote differently. A spatial position can then be assigned to the legislator, the meaning of which is then inferred from the political context. The model does not assume that these locations are the personally preferred position of the

legislator, only that, over rounds of voting, the various pressures on the legislator (sincere or strategic voting, the influence of the party or ideological concerns, for example) produce this positioning. The position of the legislator in the policy space is called his/her 'ideal point', and as Clinton *et al.* note, the "primary use of roll call data [. . .] is the estimation of ideal points" (2004, p.1).[6]

The Bayesian Item-Response Model

The basic Bayesian ideal point IRT model (Jackman, 2001, 2009, p.455) can be expressed as:[7]

$$\pi = Pr(y_{ij} = 1 | \boldsymbol{x}_i, \beta_j, \alpha_j) = F(\boldsymbol{x}_i \beta_j - \alpha_j),$$

where

- $y_{ij} \in \{0, 1\}$ is the *i*th subject's answer to the *j*th item (e.g. $y_{ij} = 1$ if 'Yes', $y_{ij} = 0$ if 'No'), where $i = 1, \ldots, n$ indexes respondents and $j = 1, \ldots, m$ indexes items;

- $\boldsymbol{x}_i \in \mathbb{R}$ is an ideal point, an unobserved latent trait of subject *i* (usually considered ability in the educational test literature, or revealed preferences in the analysis of nominal voting data);

- $\beta_j \in \mathbb{R}$ is the *discrimination* parameter of the *j*th item, showing how the probability of a correct answer responds to change in the latent trait $\boldsymbol{x}_i$;

- $\alpha_j \in \mathbb{R}$ is the *difficulty* parameter, which is the probability of a correct answer regardless of changes along the scale θ of the ideal points $\boldsymbol{x}_i$;

- $F(\cdot)$ is a monotone function mapping from the real line to the unit probability interval, typically the logistic or normal cumulative distribution function.

---

[6]The SVM has a long history. See, for example, Poole (2005).

[7]The notation in the literature varies for the ideal points $\boldsymbol{x}_i$, being at times denoted as ξ_i or θ_i. The notation here in general follows Jackman (2001), except where explicitly stated otherwise. I reserve θ for the unknown content of the policy space, i.e. the scale along which the ideal points are placed.

In the psychometrics literature, attention mainly focuses on α and β, as measures of the worth of an educational test. The ideal points, measuring the test-takers ability θ, are of secondary interest. In this model, the questions are designed, and so it is known *a priori* what a high or low score on the scale θ should signify. When adapted to the political context, the latent trait is of primary interest, although the discrimination parameter is also useful. In the original model in the education testing literature, the discrimination parameter is constrained to have only positive values, as negative discrimination (lower ability leading to higher probability of a correct answer) is undesirable and unlikely. This model can be found in the political science literature (for example, Bafumi (2005)), but the roll-call votes must be organised and recoded in such a way as to make a 'conservative' or 'liberal' vote represent a move in a particular direction (Bafumi, 2005, p.179). However, in roll-call voting, negative discrimination can be permitted and signifies that a lower position on the scale of θ (for example, a left-wing ideal point location) leads to a higher probability of voting 'Yes' on a vote proposal with this characteristic. There is added complication in the political context, as the 'questions' (proposals) are not designed as per an experiment, meaning that the substantive meaning of locations in θ are up for debate. The best that researchers can do in most cases is to run the model and infer from outside knowledge as to the content of the recovered dimensions, as the ideal points without this qualitative knowledge are "just a bunch of dots" (Poole, 2005, p.2). The Bayesian IRT model allows us other means to do so, however, as the necessity of specifying prior distributions is, for example, one opportunity to import qualitative knowledge about the political process into the estimation process. The model can also be extended with other parameters to account for theorised mechanisms, such as party pressure. For example, Lauderdale and Zucco Jr. use ideological placements, gained from surveys, as a means to specify different prior distributions for members of different parties (2011), while Lu and Wang extend the model to account for 'testlet' and 'grouplet' effects, i.e. grouping votes by theme and voters by party,

for their estimates (2011). The discrimination parameter β can tell us which proposals possess the capacity to discriminate among legislators. It is the absolute value of β that is important: high values indicate a vote that possessed the capacity to distinguish between legislators, whereas values of β near zero demonstrate that the legislators were indifferent to the outcome of the vote. Legislators with negative x values are predicted to have a higher probability of voting for proposals with high negative β values; the inverse is true for legislators with positive values on the scale of θ.

Figure 1: Interpretation of the Discrimination Parameter.

Figure 1 displays some of the curves possible with differing values of the discrimination parameter. For low values near zero, the blue line demonstrates the fact that the probability of voting 'Yes' to such a low-valued proposal does not significantly change as we move across the scale of θ. The votes that

cause a predicted separation of the senators along θ are those with high-positive (green line) and high-negative (gold line) β values. As we can see, these high values predict a distinct separation between those strongly predicted to vote 'Yes' and 'No'. Note that it is the difficulty parameter α that controls where on the θ scale that these lines change from a positive prediction to a negative one. In this example, α is set to zero. The use of this parameter to analyse the hypothesis that senators delegate on foreign policy is simple: if foreign policy votes do not have the capacity to discriminate between senators, this means that these senators are indifferent to the outcome of the vote. Since most foreign policy proposals emanate from either the Executive or the government coalition, we can take non-discriminating votes as evidence of delegation to the Executive branch on these specific proposals.

Voting behaviour on foreign policy themes has been analysed in the literature by separating foreign policy votes from domestic policy votes and then producing ideal points from the subset to compare either with previous work or the full set; as was previously noted, no differences between the two sets of ideal points have been found (e.g. Oliveira, 2013; Onuki et al., 2009).[8] I have employed a slightly different method for the current analysis, one that adapts the dynamic ideal point model of Martin and Quinn (2002). The dynamic model of Martin and Quinn is a standard two-parameter Bayesian IRT model where the ideal points x_{it} of legislator i are allowed to vary over the time periods t. My approach is to let the ideal points vary over the topics k:

$$y_{ijk} = \boldsymbol{x}_{ik}\beta_j - \alpha_j,$$

with a 'base' ideal point that reflects the ideal point for senator i as in a simple unidimensional non-dynamic Bayesian IRT model. To account for temporal dependence, the variance structure in the prior

---

[8]This method of comparison is not free of complications resulting from the lack of formal comparability across two separate scales (Bailey, 2007).

distribution for the ideal points in the dynamic model of Martin and Quinn is that of a 'random walk', where the best guess we can make about the value of $\boldsymbol{x}_i$ at time t is its value at time $t-1$:

$$\boldsymbol{x}_{it} \backsim \mathcal{N}(\boldsymbol{x}_{i,t-1}, \Delta_{\boldsymbol{x}_{ij}}),$$

where $\Delta_{\boldsymbol{x}_{ij}}$ is what Martin and Quinn (2002) term the 'evolution' variance parameter.[9] Since I have no *a priori* reason to think that topics are particularly dependent on one another or independent of each other, $\boldsymbol{x}_{ik}$ are given prior distributions with mean zero across all topics, and so are not related to $\boldsymbol{x}_{i,k-1}$.[10] Thus, every senator will have a separate ideal point for each topic, along with a base ideal point for comparison. In this way, we achieve two things: first, we can open up 'foreign policy' to explore the various sub-themes inside the area, and second, we can compare these foreign policy themes directly with other themes. As studies in the literature have found no difference between voting on foreign policy themes and voting on domestic politics in the Chamber of Deputies (e.g. Ribeiro and Miranda, 2011; Oliveira, 2013), this model allows for an extension of the discussion of these findings to the Senate.

Results

Discrimination of Foreign Policy Votes

Given that θ is primarily a mixture between ideology and government influence (McDonnell, 2016), this would suggest that large negative values of β should belong to votes for which left-wing senators

---

[9]If $\Delta_{\boldsymbol{x}_{ij}} = 0$, this is the same as having fixed ideal points. As $\Delta_{\boldsymbol{x}_{ij}} \to \infty$, we get a model in which the $\boldsymbol{x}_{it}$ are independent across time. (Martin and Quinn, 2002, p.140)

[10]There well may be good reason to believe that some topics are related, however, for simplicity, I assumed independence. For work that does not need to focus on a smaller subset of the votes such as foreign policy, the topic models of Lauderdale and Clark (2014) or Gerrish and Blei (2012) may be better options.

are predicted to support with higher probability, and vice-versa for right-wing senators. Themes that we find with low values of β are usually associated with these issues belonging to a higher dimension (Jackman, 2001); however, the underlying idea is that these proposals fail to distinguish between the voters. Since there is little evidence to suppose a second (or higher) dimension in the Senate (Mc-Donnell, 2016), this would suggest that themes with values of β close to zero are those for which the senators are simply indifferent, with no higher-dimension interpretation necessary.

Table 3 presents the topics that discriminate exclusively either far to the left ($\beta \leq -2.5$) or far to the right ($\beta \geq 2.5$). There are no exclusive left-wing topics in Sarney's tenure, nor are there on the right for Franco.

Table 3: Topics that discriminate exclusively on the right/left by presidency.

Presidency	Left-wing Topics	Right-wing Topics
Sarney	(None)	Public Sector, Political Norms, Government
Collor	Social Security	Property, Public Sector, Labour, Procedural
Franco	Elections, Commerce	(None)
Cardoso I	Elections, Judiciary	Telecommunications, Labour, Government, Military, Monetary Policy, Commerce, National Program, Social Affairs
Cardoso II	Social Affairs, Banking, Education, Government, Health National Program,	States, Labour, Political Norms, Telecommunications, Trade, Elections, Social Security
Lula I	Infrastructure, Education, Security, Government, Trade, Procedural	Natural Resources
Lula II	Budgetary, Industry, National Program, Taxation, Public Sector Int'l Relations, Trade	Education, Infrastructure, Government, Banking

In terms of foreign policy themes, we can see from the table that these are related to the government in power. 'Trade' and 'International Relations' have high-negative β values during Lula's terms, indicating that votes on these themes received more support from left-wing senators: hardly surprising given that the Executive is the source of most of these proposals. 'Trade' switches over to the right side during Cardoso's time, where we also find 'Monetary Policy' and 'Military'. Hence, right-wing senators are predicted to support votes on these themes during Cardoso's presidencies. It is not particularly surprising to find the themes of 'Monetary Policy' and 'Military' on the right: the Brazilian right is known for connections to the military, and high-positive values for 'Monetary Policy' suggest support for the Executive during this period, in which there were periods of crisis and reform related to the theme. **Table 4** provides data on the question relating to abdication and delegation.

Table 4: Non-discriminating foreign policy themes across the presidencies. † There is a second dimensional element to Collor's presidency and so this presidency should be interpreted differently than the others.

Presidency	Foreign Policy Themes where β is indistinguishable from zero
Sarney	–
Collor	Trade; Monetary Policy; Military†
Franco	Military
Cardoso I	International Relations
Cardoso II	Security; Military
Lula I	International Relations; Military
Lula II	Security; Military

The pattern from Franco to Lula's second term is quite striking. Clearly, if senators do delegate in favour of the Executive, they do it with regard to matters of diplomacy[11], national security and the military. This finding suggests a division between the 'high politics' of these non-discriminating themes and the 'low politics' of trade and monetary policy, which do discriminate among senators. The delegation hypothesis is therefore contingent upon the type of foreign policy proposal being considered. On this evidence, senators do in fact delegate to the Executive in the areas of the military, diplomacy and

---

[11] 'International Relations' encompasses diplomatic matters.

national security. This also supports the 'Two-Presidents Thesis' described earlier (Wildavsky, 1966), with the aforementioned caveat that this bipartisanship in foreign policy matters applies only to 'high politics'. This finding is in contrast to much of the literature, where evidence for bipartisanship with regard to foreign policy in Latin America has not been found (e.g. Ribeiro, 2012), but is in keeping with the literature on the United States (e.g. Prins and Marshall, 2001).

Ideal points for foreign policy themes

The topic model produces ideal points for all the topics present in a given legislature; the ideal points for government senators are coloured blue, whereas opposition senators are coloured red. Some topics cause the legislators to 'bunch together' in agreement: there is little controversy on these votes and so the senators are not separated spatially. Other votes cause a separation along the scale of θ, indicating that the topic in question caused disagreement and different senators are predicted to have quite different probabilities of voting yes. For us to find support for the hypothesis that foreign policy is treated the same as domestic policy, i.e. $\theta_{\text{fp}} = \theta_{\text{dp}}$ in the Senate, we would have to observe similar probabilities of voting yes for all topics; in other words, similar spatial positions across domestic policy and foreign policy. The long-standing debate on abdication/delegation in foreign policy matters may also be (partially) analysed. As was discussed earlier, hypotheses of abdication and/or delegation reduce to the same empirical test using nominal votes. Either the senators display signs of indifference or their ideal points spread out along the scale, as is the case for the basic unidimensional model. Observing signs of indifference may be interpreted as support for the idea that senators delegate to the Executive; the distinction between abdication and delegation is not relevant here, nor is it possible to examine.

Starting with the Lula presidencies, we may notice a pattern that is consistent throughout the figures presented for this model: senators are indifferent to vote outcomes across a majority of the topics in all legislatures, indicating that there are a few key areas in every legislature that are the political battle-grounds. In Lula's first term (**Fig. 2**), there are only three: 'Labour', 'Natural Resources' and 'Public Sector'. While it may come as no surprise that the policy space of the first left-wing government in Brazil's history witnessed disagreement over labour and public sector issues, the disagreement evident

18

over natural resources is unexpected.


Figure 2: Ideal Points by topic, Lula I.

Looking closer at the content of the specific proposals under this label, we can see that there is at least one proposal that could be expected to create spatial differentiation in an ideological space: MPV0144/03, which proposed the regulation of the energy sector, ostensibly seeking to improve the quality of service and protect consumers from high prices. Although this initiative – a key part of a larger project by Dilma Rousseff to construct a new model for the electric energy sector in Brazil – was originally supported by the Executive, the nominal vote was not; some 800 amendments by deputies and senators ended up disfiguring the original project and causing multiple delays in the passage of the bill (Ludmer, 2007). As such, it is a good example of the mix of determinants of voting behaviour that we observe. The opposition claimed that the proposal would place excessive demands on the industry and would weaken investor confidence in the sector (Ludmer, 2007), classically right-wing

positions taken by a right-wing opposition. That said, the overwhelming multitude of amendments and the delaying tactics of the opposition point to an opposition prepared to frustrate the government at any opportunity and hence support a government–opposition interpretation of θ; after all, the opposition could have just voted 'No'. The other proposals under this label also lend credence to this view, as the content of the other 'Natural Resources' proposals is not indicative of a classic right–left ideological split.[12]

Importantly for our purposes here, we do not see spatial differentiation on any foreign policy themes, only 'Trade' being ever so slightly less than totally bunched together. This strongly suggests that for this legislature, senators were indifferent to vote outcomes for foreign policy themed proposals. As such, the hypothesis that senators delegate to the Executive in foreign policy matters receives support from an analysis of this legislature. However, it is not correct to claim that $\theta_{\mathrm{fp}} = \theta_{\mathrm{dp}}$; clearly, it depends on the domestic policy being considered. Moving to Lula's second term (**Fig. 3**), we see that only proposals under the label 'Trade' have the capacity to distinguish between senators along θ. The substance of the two 'Trade' proposals show a strong tendency towards free trade; their content is shown in **Table 5**. As can be seen from the table, these proposals were geared towards making the export of Brazilian goods easier and the raising of the profile of these goods abroad. PLV0020/08, in particular, displays many of the characteristics we would expect from a left-wing government. However, large-scale agricultural exporters also benefit from these export-friendly measures. It is worth noting that powerful landed agricultural interests have a long history of ties to the right; indeed, their political opposition, the Landless Rural Worker's Movement (*Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra*), have an equally intertwined history with the left (Robles et al., 2015).

---

[12]They were MPV0120/03, MPV0145/03 and MPV0248/05; the first proposed authorising the Union to buy credit from the states related to royalties from hydroelectric and other energy resources; the second, to create the Energy Research Company (*Empresa de Pesquisa Energética*) to carry out studies of the electricity sector; the third, to make available extraordinary credit to the Ministry of Science and Technology for research in the area of petroleum and the energy sector. Only this latter vote was contentious.

Figure 3: Ideal Points by topic, Lula II.

Ideologically, we may suppose that the *alignment of preferences* posited by Milner (1997) receives support from trade proposals in this legislature, however, both the PFL/DEM and the PSDB voted 'No' with 100% of their senators for these votes; the PTB, the other right-wing party in the Senate according to the scale of Power and Zucco Jr. (2009) and a member of the government, voted 'Yes' (100%) for both votes, suggesting that government–opposition, or at least PFL/DEM-PSDB vs. PT, was a crucial determinant during this time. I speculate PFL/DEM-PSDB vs. PT because the other major party in the government, the PMDB, was split for both votes, with a minority voting 'No' both times. There is some evidence of the regional divide in the PMDB (Zucco Jr., 2008) for these votes: the states for the 'No' camp are Piauí, Pernambuco and Acre, all northern or north-eastern states.

**Table 5:** Content of 'Trade' proposals during Lula's second term.

Proposal	Content
PLV0019/08	Suspends tax contributions on the import of oil-related storage, boats and port facilities; reduces to zero taxes on the import of parts for the modernization of ships; reduces tax on the acquisition of goods and capital by exporters; seeks to improve port infrastructure; contains other export-friendly measures and measures to reduce taxes on the industrial sector and promote investment.
PLV0020/08	Authorises the involvement of the Union in the Guarantee Fund for Naval Construction, in order to invest in this strategic sector (create jobs, reduce dependence on foreign freight services); permits the use of the Euro for the production or commercialization of 'international insertion' goods; permits BNDES to use the Euro for the financing of export-boosting projects; permits BNDES to establish subsidiaries abroad to help with the international insertion of Brazilian companies and regional integration; contains anti-dumping measures; contains export-boosting and import-limiting measures for the following sectors: software, fruit, ceramics, information technology services and capital services; contains other export-promoting measures.

Regarding other parties, the majority of the 'No' voters also came from northern or north-eastern states; the only states outside this region were Minas Gerais, Goias, the Distrito Federal, Mato Grosso and Paraná (there were 28 senators in all who voted against these proposals).[13]

Indeed, this putative PT vs. PSDB-PFL/DEM split highlights an interesting aspect of the behaviour of the parties in the Senate. As others have noted (Barros, 2015; Power and Zucco Jr., 2009), there is not actually a huge *ideological* disparity between the PSDB and the PMDB, and indeed the PT. Nevertheless, we repeatedly observe the PSDB aligning itself on the far right with the ideologically right-wing PFL. This calls attention to the conflation of ideology and *strategy* that we repeatedly observe, making inferences about the 'true' positions of the parties difficult, in particular the PT and the PSDB. One way to see this clearly is by means of the aforementioned dynamic ideal-point model of Martin and Quinn (2002). Applying this model to the Senate, we can see clearly the consistency of the strategy/ideology adopted by the PT and the PSDB: over the fifteen years since the PT first became a significant pres-

---

[13]In fact, for southern Paraná, all three senators to represent the state voted 'No' to PLV0020/08, even though the senators were members of the PT, the PDT and PSDB, respectively.

22

ence in the Senate, ideal points for the two parties rarely enter into the same area of the policy space, making the PSDB more extreme than we would expect. The large heterogeneity in the ideal points for the PMDB point to its status a catch-all party of no ideological extremity.

Figure 4: Dynamic Ideal Points for the PT, PMDB, PSDB and PFL (in that order), 1995-2010.

Considering Cardoso's first term, there is again separation on the topic of 'Trade', with the other foreign-policy topics ('Monetary Policy', 'International Relations' and 'Security' were all present in this legislature) appearing to result in indifference among the senators. There were four trade-related proposals during this period: PEC0029/95, PEC0032/95, PLC0115/93, PLC0087/96 and PRS0104/96; all were Executive initiatives, mostly related to the economic restructuring plans of Cardoso, with the exception of PRS0104/96, proposed by Senator Júnia Marise of the PDT.

Figure 5: Ideal Points by topic, FHC I.

Their content is summarised in **Table 6**. PRS0104/96 was included in 'Trade' and hence classified as relating to foreign policy because the discussion of the privatisation of the Vale do Rio Doce company at this time included heated debate on foreign ownership of the company. As Senator José Dutra is quoted in the Senate Diary: "What are the guarantees, if the company is privatized, that foreign companies (*the only ones capable of buying it*), would care for social and regional development, as happens now?" (Senado Federal, 1995, p.8544, author's translation and emphasis). As we can see, the Executive proposals related mainly to the economic liberalisation that took place in this period.

Table 6: Content of 'Trade' proposals, Cardoso's first government.

Proposal	Content
PEC0029/95	Permits greater private investment in gas resources while maintaining state involvement.
PEC0032/95	Eliminates distinction between 'Brazilian Company' and 'Brazilian Company of National Capital' and the preferential treatment to the latter, with the objective of attracting foreign investment to mineral and energy sectors.
PLC0115/93	Revises the Industrial Property code, patent rights and patent laws; harmonizes Brazilian laws with international standards; implements the TRIPS-WTO agreement.
PLC0087/96	Deals with waterway transport; ports; shipping; norms in territorial waters.
PRS0104/96	Deals with controls on the Executive relative to the privatisation of the Vale do Rio Doce company.

Both these latter two legislatures analysed, Cardoso's first (1995-1999) and Lula's second (2007-2010), demonstrate that only trade policy seems to result in spatial separation along θ in the Senate. This is in keeping with the finding from the previous chapter: 'high politics' appears to be delegated upwards to the Executive, whereas the 'low politics' of trade induces legislative involvement. In contrast, Lula's first term (2003-2007) and Cardoso's second (1999-2003)(see **Fig. 6**) do not display trade-related differentiation amongst the senators. Indeed, Cardoso's second term is the only one where we observe 'Monetary Policy' and 'International Relations' being associated with movements in the ideal points along θ. The fact that proposals relating to monetary policy are not related to delegation in this legislature is not a surprise, given that this was the period in which Cardoso was forced into devaluation of the Brazilian currency amid the spread of financial crises from Asia and Russia, and the default on debt of the state of Minas Gerais (Palma, 2012). The fact that Cardoso had to fight hard to see essential monetary policy bills passed (Zucco Jr. and Lauderdale, 2011) suggests that some of the senators saw this as a perfect opportunity to extract concessions from the Executive (Zucco Jr. and Lauderdale, 2011, p.384). In either case, it is a context-dependent finding that does not extend to other legislatures, as it is clear that the acute crisis starting in 1999 had a serious effect on the entire legislature.

Regarding the finding for 'International Relations', there were five separate proposals, and nine votes, under this topic heading. Two involved international conventions: the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, and the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants. Two others dealt with the relationship between foreigners and Brazilians – PEC0005/02 proposed that media companies may be owned only by Brazilians or foreigners who have been naturalised for 10 years or more, and PEC0061/99 proposed voting rights for foreigners resident in Brazil, at the municipal level – and the final proposal was a loan authorisation, of the amount of $3.4 billion, under the terms of understanding of the Paris Club. None of these votes were particularly contentious, with the exception of the loan authorisation. However, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women was supported by only 27% of the house, unusual for U.N. treaties, which are usually passed with high levels of support. Nonetheless, it appears that the proposal on media ownership caused the spatial separation we observe. It passed through four rounds of voting, receiving varying levels of support (from a low of 7% to a high of 95%); it also resulted in involved debate in both the Chamber and the Senate, amidst the fears of some senators regarding cultural domination by foreign sources (Senado Federal, 2002, p.4069). This is not dissimilar to the debate surrounding the ownership of Vale do Rio Doce: both proposals allow us to observe a nationalist tendency regarding foreign ownership of businesses in strategically important areas. This does not seem to be linked to ideology along a left–right scale, however, even though right-wing parties often have a history of nationalism in other countries. The government parties at this time, the PSDB, PPB and the PMDB, were almost unanimous in their support of the Executive (slightly less than 10% of the PMDB senators voted 'No' or abstained when the government indicated a 'Yes' preference on this proposal); the opposition parties were also supportive of the Executive, with only a minority of the PT disagreeing, and only the PDT substantially split by the proposal. The PFL voted almost unanimously in support of the government even though they had just left the coalition in protest. Hence, we see right and left voting with the Executive on this proposal, which was, after all, hardly even liberal in its aspirations, suggesting nationalism, if it is a factor in foreign policy voting, is common to all parties.

The topic models of Presidents Franco, Collor and Sarney do not display any spatial separation among

Figure 6: Ideal Points by topic, FHC II.

the senators for any foreign policy themes. For Sarney, the low number of votes makes the estimation of ideal points using this model less than optimal, as for some themes, there are very few votes and voters. These legislatures present interesting findings relevant to other issues areas, perhaps an interesting area for future research. As regards our present discussion, 'Military' is present in both the Collor and Franco presidencies, and results in indifference for both, further lending support to our earlier findings of delegation on these themes. 'International Relations' in the Sarney presidency likewise demonstrates the indifference that we can link to delegation to the Executive (votes on the topic 'Military' did not occur during Sarney's time; 'International Relations' did not feature during the periods of Collor and Franco).

Conclusion

Thus an examination of ideal points on the various thematic areas has shown that there is strong evidence, with both the parameters x and β from the dynamic and static Bayesian IRT model, of delegation to the Executive on matters of security, defence, the military and diplomatic matters. On a substantive level, this makes sense. As was mentioned earlier, the mechanism underlying the legislator-as-conduit framework can apply to any polity, assuming the effects of the policies in question have some domestic effects. It appears that proposals relating to 'high politics' are not thought by senators to affect the domestic polity, and thus are judged to be a matter solely for the Executive branch. We can see that the estimation of ideal points for separate themes shed more light on whether foreign policy themes can be considered similar to domestic policy themes. Quite clearly, it depends on the theme. A possible next step is to see how these findings play out in the Chamber of Deputies. While the theoretical reasons for associating the Senate with foreign policy are not as prevalent, the majority of the work done on nominal voting in Brazil has been on the Chamber of Deputies and so the extension of the analysis presented here would be of interest, as would extending the research to other Latin American states. Beyond this step, there is of course the important question of *why* Brazilian legislators delegate on these themes, which is difficult to answer with nominal votes alone.

References

Ames, B. (1995). Electoral Rules, Constituency Pressures, and Pork Barrel: Bases of Voting in the Brazilian Congress. *Journal of Politics*, 57(2):324–343.

Bafumi, J. (2005). Practical Issues in Implementing and Understanding Bayesian Ideal Point Estimation. *Political Analysis*, 13(2):171–187.

Bailey, M. A. (2007). Comparable Preference Estimates across Time and Institutions for the Court, Congress, and Presidency. *American Journal of Political Science*, 51(3):433–448.

Barros, C. (2015). O giro do PSDB no espectro politico e o deslocamento do PT. *Folha de São Paulo*, 9 September.

Black, D. (1948). On the rationale of group decision-making. *Journal of Political Economy*, 56(1):23–34.

Broz, J. L. (2005). Congressional Politics of International Financial Rescues. *American Journal of Political Science*, 49(3):479–496.

Broz, J. L. and Frieden, J. A. (2001). The Political Economy of International Monetary Relations. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 4(1):317–343.

Broz, J. L. and Hawes, M. B. (2006). Congressional Politics of Financing the International Monetary Fund. *International Organization*, 60(2):367–399.

Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., and Morrow, J. D. (2003). *The Logic of Political Survival*. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.

Cason, J. W. and Power, T. J. (2009). Presidentialism, Pluralization, and the Rollback of Itamaraty: Explaining Change in Brazilian Foreign Policy Making in the Cardoso-Lula Era. *International Political Science Review*, 30(2):117–140.

Clinton, J. D., Jackman, M., and Jackman, S. (2013). Characterizing Chief Executives: Comparing Presidential and Congressional Preferences and Their Effect on Lawmaking, Agency Budgeting, and Unilateral Executive Action, 1874–2010. Working Paper.

Clinton, J. D., Jackman, S., and Rivers, D. (2004). The statistical analysis of roll call data. *American Political Science Review*, 98(02):355–370.

Diniz, S. (2012). O Senado Federal e a deliberação de atos internacionais no presidencialismo brasileiro. *Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais*, 27(80).

Downs, A. (1957). An economic theory of political action in a democracy. *The Journal of Political Economy*, 65(2):135–150.

Figueiredo, A. C. and Limongi, F. (2000). Presidential Power, Legislative Organization, and Party Behavior in Brazil. *Comparative Politics*, 32(2):151.

Fleisher, R., Bond, J. R., Krutz, G. S., and Hanna, S. (2000). The Demise of the Two Presidencies. *American Politics Research*, 28(1):3–25.

Flynn, P. (1996). Brazil: the politics of the 'Plano Real'. *Third World Quarterly*, 17(3):401–426.

Frieden, J. A. (1988). Sectoral conflict and foreign economic policy, 1914-1940. *International Organization*, 42(1):59–90.

Gerrish, S. and Blei, D. M. (2011). Predicting legislative roll calls from text. In *Proceedings of the 28th international conference on machine learning*, pages 489–496.

Gerrish, S. and Blei, D. M. (2012). How they vote: Issue-adjusted models of legislative behavior. In Pereira, F., Burges, C., and Bottou, L., editors, *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, volume 25, pages 2753–2761.

Helfand, S. M. (1999). The Political Economy of Agricultural Policy in Brazil: Decision Making and Influence from 1964 to 1992. *Latin American Research Review*, 34(2):3–41.

Jackman, S. (2001). Multidimensional analysis of roll call data via Bayesian simulation: identification, estimation, inference, and model checking. *Political Analysis*, 9(3):227–241.

Jackman, S. (2009). *Bayesian analysis for the Social Sciences*. Wiley series in probability and statistics. Wiley, Chichester, U.K.

Karol, D. (2007). Does constituency size affect elected officials' trade policy preferences? *Journal of Politics*, 69(2):483–494.

Lauderdale, B. E. and Clark, T. S. (2014). Scaling politically meaningful dimensions using texts and votes. *American Journal of Political Science*, 58(3):754–771.

Lemos, L. B. (2010). *Brazilian Congress and Foreign Affairs: Abdication or Delegation?* Global Economic Governance Programme, GEG Working Paper 2010/58.

Lu, Y. and Wang, X. (2011). Understanding complex legislative and judicial behaviour via hierarchical ideal point estimation. *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series C (Applied Statistics)*, 60(1):93–107.

Ludmer, P. (2007). *Derriça Elétrica*. Artliber Editora, São Paulo.

Malamud, A. (2005). Presidential Diplomacy and the Institutional Underpinnings of MERCOSUR: An Empirical Examination. *Latin American Research Review*, 40(1):138–164.

Mansfield, E. D., Milner, H. V., and Rosendorff, B. P. (2002). Why democracies cooperate more: Electoral control and international trade agreements. *International Organization*, 56(3):477–513.

Martin, A. and Quinn, K. (2002). Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999. *Political Analysis*, 10(2):134–153.

McCormick, J. M. and Wittkopf, E. R. (1990). Bipartisanship, Partisanship, and Ideology in Congressional-Executive Foreign Policy Relations, 1947–1988. *The Journal of Politics*, 52(04):1077–1100.

McDonnell, R. M. (2016). *Explaining the Determinants of Foreign Policy Voting Behaviour in the Brazilian Houses of Legislature, with a Focus on the Senate*. PhD thesis, Universidade de São Paulo.

Milner, H. V. (1997). *Interests, Institutions, and Information*. Princeton University Press.

Milner, H. V. and Tingley, D. (2015). *Sailing the Water's Edge: The Domestic Politics of American Foreign Policy*. Princeton University Press.

Milner, H. V. and Tingley, D. H. (2009). The Political Economy of U.S. Foreign Aid: American Legislators and the Domestic Politics of Aid. *Economics & Politics*, 22(2):200–232.

Milner, H. V. and Tingley, D. H. (2011). Who supports global economic engagement? The sources of preferences in American foreign economic policy. *International Organization*, 65(01):37–68.

Neiva, P. (2008). Os poderes dos senados de países presidencialistas e o caso do Brasil. In Lemos, L. B., editor, *O Senado Federal brasileiro no pós-constituinte*, Edições Unilegis de Ciência Política, chapter 1, pages 23–62. Senado Federal, Unilegis.

Oliveira, A. J. d. (2013). Partidos Políticos, Legislativo e Política Externa no Brasil: de 1995 à 2009. CAENI Working Paper.

Onuki, J., Ribeiro, P. F., and Oliveira, A. J. d. (2009). Political parties, foreign policy and ideology: Argentina and Chile in comparative perspective. *Brazilian Political Science Review*, 4.

Orman, J. (1988). The president and interest group access. *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 18(4):787–791.

Palma, J. G. (2012). The 1999 Brazilian financial crisis: how to create a financial crisis by trying to avoid one. *Financial Stability and Growth Workshop*, Center of Structuralist Development Macroeconomics, Fundação Getulio Vargas.

Poole, K. T. (2005). *Spatial models of parliamentary voting*. Cambridge University Press, New York.

Power, T. J. and Zucco Jr., C. (2009). Estimating Ideology of Brazilian Legislative Parties, 1990-2005. *Latin American Research Review*, 44(1).

Prins, B. C. and Marshall, B. W. (2001). Congressional Support of the President: A Comparison of Foreign, Defense, and Domestic Policy Decision Making during and after the Cold War. *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 31(4):660–678.

Putnam, R. D. (1988). Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games. *International Organization*, 42(3):427–460.

Ribeiro, P. F. (2012). *Comportamento Legislativo e Política Externa na América Latina*. PhD thesis, Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas, São Paulo.

Ribeiro, P. F. and Miranda, R. (2011). Congresso Nacional e Política Externa. O caso do envio de tropas ao Haiti: Argentina, Brasil e Chile. *Revista Política Hoje*, 20(1).

Robles, W., Petras, J., and Veltmeyer, H. (2015). *The Politics of Agrarian Reform in Brazil: The Landless Rural Workers Movement*. Social Movements and Transformation. Palgrave Macmillan, New York.

Rogowski, R. (1989). *Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments*. Princeton University Press.

Schneider, B. R. (1997). Organized Business Politics in Democratic Brazil. *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, 39(4):95–127.

Senado Federal (1995). *Diário Oficial do Senado Federal*. Number 82. Senado Federal, Brasília.

Senado Federal (2002). *Diário Oficial do Senado Federal*. Number 36. Senado Federal, Brasília.

Simmons, B. (1997). *Who Adjusts?* Princeton University Press.

Sklair, L. (1997). Social Movements for Global Capitalism: The Transnational Capitalist Class in Action. *Review of International Political Economy*, 4(3):514–538.

Wildavsky, A. (1966). The two presidencies. *Trans-action*, 4(2):7–14.

Zucco Jr., C. (2008). The President's 'New' Constituency: Lula and the Pragmatic Vote in Brazil's 2006 Presidential Elections. *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 40:29–49.

Zucco Jr., C. and Lauderdale, B. E. (2011). Distinguishing Between Influences on Brazilian Legislative Behavior: Brazilian Legislative Behavior. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 36(3):363–396.