

Do political parties matter for subnational international activities? Evidence from Brazilian municipalities

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Abstract

Do political parties influence the decision of subnational governments go abroad? The article explores if the relationship between party ideology and some policies could be applied for subnational international activities. The internationalization of left-wing municipal administrations is higher in Brazil, especially by PT. Although counterintuitive, this occurrence is justified by the redemocratization and decentralization agenda of the 1980s and by the internationalist view of the Brazilian left parties. Considering the risk of confounding and the high imbalance of the groups, the tests were applied in balanced samples with genetic matching. In fact, left-wing parties actually become more internationalized in Brazilian municipalities. Meanwhile, PT does not differ from the other leftist parties, strengthening the ideological hypothesis to the detriment of the organizational.

Key-Words: Paradiplomacy, subnational international activities, partisan ideology, Brazilian municipalities, genetic matching.

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1. Introduction

The last decades of the twentieth century observed the emergence of a phenomenon that relates domestic and external aspects of politics: the internationalization of subnational governments. It was a new phenomenon both in the qualitative sense by the autonomous international action of these governments as well as in quantitative terms with the increase of the scope of its performance (Soldatos, 1990). The development of these actions would originate (1) at the level of the federated unit¹, (2) at the level of the Nation-State or (3) at the international level, a result of Complex Interdependence (Soldatos, 1993). With responsibility for various policies divided between central governments, subnational governments and non-state actors, these activities would result from the difficulty in dissociating internal and external issues. Thus, the decision to act internationally would result from a combination of factors at different levels.

¹Although the use of federated unit as a governmental level, it must be understood that the explanations are related to the subnational level of government, since the actions are not exclusive to federal states

However, there is a greater tendency to observe motivations at the subnational level despite institutional differences at the Nation-State and international levels. In this sense, they would be the result of (1) distinct subnational realities and perceptions, (2) nationalism, (3) bureaucratic expansion and competition among different governmental elites; (4) socioeconomic crises and the need for external assistance (resources, trade, investments, etc.), (5) electoralism and (6) "me-tooism" (Soldatos, 1993). In a simpler way, they would respond to economic, political and cultural interests (Keating, 1999) or the interest/need for international cooperation (Lecours, 2002). Promotion of local businesses, attraction of investments or obtaining of financing, and promotion as a tourist destination would be the economic objectives of these actions. In the cultural field, it would seek the projection of local/regional leader as representative of specific ethnicity/culture, and the nationalist affirmation of the region or locality. International cooperation would be related to the solution of common problems between governments and the exchange of best practices.

Political sphere of the phenomenon would be strongly associated with nationalistic aspirations, being difficult to differentiate the action by cultural motivations. Even if one considers the electoral aspect pointed out by Soldatos (1993), its scope would be limited because it is a little salient policy. Due to these aspects, political parties receive almost no attention from the literature on the subject. Mentions are limited to separatist, nationalist (Keating, 1999), regionalist or ethno-linguistic parties (Lecours, 2002). When not, are references to a possible influence of political leader or party ideology (Kuznetsov, 2015) without, however, detailing the mechanisms in which this relationship would develop.

More specifically, since partisan theory (Hibbs, 1977) there are recurrent questions about the influence or not of the political party on various policies including the subnational levels of government. Thinking about the subnational international activities, in Brazil an association was established between left-wing parties and the phenomenon as a result of the first experiences observed in the 1980s, a period of redemocratization (Nunes, 2005). In this regard, special attention is given to the Workers' Party (PT), which would have an even more intense historic in the development of these actions (Salomon, 2011). The relationship between left-wing parties and the phenomenon is somewhat counterintuitive, since economic factors appear at the forefront of comparative literature (Aldecoa & Cornago, 2009; McMillan, 2008).

This article sheds light on some limitations in comparative literature. From a theoretical perspective, untie the political question of nationalism and separatism and thus enable the replication of empirical tests in locations where these conditions are not present. Thus, the main objective would be to observe whether political parties matter for the internationalization of subnational governments when they are not endowed with nationalist or separatist aspirations. By appropriating the debate initiated by party theory, it will see whether political ideology leads to distinct outcomes in the international activities of subnational governments at the primary level. Otherwise, does ideology matter for the development of the policy? The displacement of the question to the Brazilian case allows us to specify the question: municipalities governed by leftist parties are more likely to internationalize? For this, it is also necessary to test if the PT has an even greater propensity to internationalize at the municipal level. If so, this could indicate a "petista" bias on the left, as well as bring the issue of party organization as a possible explanation.

From an analysis about Profile of Brazilian Municipalities in 2012 (IBGE, 2013), a database was built providing information about its internationalization. Electoral, socio-economic and ge-

ographic information that would be related to policy development was added². In this sense, two different treatments were applied in the statistical tests. In the first, it was compared if municipalities ruled by left-wing parties are more internationalized than those governed by centrist and right-wing parties³. With second treatment, the comparison was between the municipalities governed by the PT and those governed by other leftist parties. This makes it possible to verify if the PT really has an "international vocation" at the municipal level. Alternatively, it works as a robustness test, since the differentiation of the PT in relation to the other left-wing parties could be associated with the organizational structure of the party (Samuels, 2006; Samuels & Zucco, 2015; Van Dyck, 2014) and not with the ideology.

Observation of the descriptive statistics shows that the left parties have higher relative frequencies in the internationalization variables, especially the PT. Use of means difference tests corroborates the initial impression for both treatments, that is, leftist parties would internationalize more than those of center and right and the PT more than the others of the left. However, the risk of confounding exists due to socioeconomic (per capita GDP, Gini index and proportion of municipality's own resources), political (participation in cities networks and margin of victory of the elected mayor) and geographical (IBGE geographical region, proportion of urban population and the presence of border with neighboring countries) issues⁴.

To overcome the possible biases generated by the confounders in the means difference tests, genetic matching was used for balancing between the control and treatment groups for both treatments. In addition, regression models with different confounding specifications were applied to observe the robustness of the results. Use of genetic matching indicated that the results of the treatment "Left-Wing Parties" remain while for the "PT" treatment disappear. Thus, the effect of leftist parties on the internationalization of Brazilian municipalities would be related to the ideology and not to the organizational structure of the PT.

This article has four more sessions besides the introduction. The next section deals with the literature on partisan ideology and public policies. Speaking about the Brazilian parties, it focuses on the guidelines of the international dimension in their statutes. The third section deals with the data and the methods. At first, the data base, the operationalization of treatments and some central data for the development of the analysis are presented. In a second moment, the presentation of genetic matching and the quality of balance between groups are the focus. The fourth section brings the analysis of the tests related to partisan ideology about left-wing and "petista" hypotheses. Lastly, the last section presents the conclusions and implications of the results.

Political parties and subnational international activities

International activities of subnational governments are the development of a public policy with international outlines. From an analytical point of view, the discussion thus forms part of the debate on the design and implementation of decentralized public policies within the territorial limits of the State. However, the fact that subnational governments also act internationally and develop a public policy that extends to the international goes unnoticed (Lecours, 2008). Despite

²The replication file for the construction of the database is part of the Appendix B

³The ideological classification of the Brazilian parties was based on the standardized estimates in the legislative surveys of Power and Zucco (2012b). The parties classified as left-wing were: PSOL, PCdoB, PT, PSB and PDT. As centrist and right-wing: PV, PPS, PMDB, PSDB (centrist), PTB, PR, PP e DEM (right-wing). Further details on the operationalization are in section [Do political parties matter?](#).

⁴A greater detail of the risk of each confounder is detailed in Section [Data and Methods](#).

the discussion about the influence of partisan ideology on public policies, in the case of subnational international activities the issue is ignored.

Motivations for this internationalization would be economic, political, cultural (Keating, 1999), or would be an instrument for international cooperation (Lecours, 2002). As economic issues are the main source for the development of these actions (Aldecoa & Cornago, 2009; McMullan, 2008), the political dimension is relegated to a second place, treating since chief's desire until nationalist/separatist aspirations (Keating, 1999; Kincaid, 1990, 1999; Kuznetsov, 2015; Lecours, 2002; Soldatos, 1990, 1993). In extreme situations, the action resulting from political issues would be the "protodiplomacy", based on "initiatives and activities of a non-central government abroad that graft a more or less separatist message on to its economic, social, and cultural links with foreign nations" (Duchacek, 1990, p. 27). As a result of this bias, the political dimension explores specific aspects of singular cases, such as nationalist and/or separatist regions in Canada, (Balthazar, 1999; Huijgh, 2010; McNiven & Cann, 1993; Nossal, 1993) and Spain (Paquin, 2004; Zubiri, 1999), or of Belgian federalism (Lejeune, 1990; Paquin, 2004, 2010).

However, if considered the debate of differences between political parties on public policies, there are results that indicate the partisan influence or not depending on the type of policy. Hibbs (1977) presented the hypothesis of influence of the party's composition of the government on the public spending, originating the discussion about the "partisan theory". From then on, an agenda was developed on the relation between party ideology and public policies. Differences of ideology over outputs vary with the policy area (Imbeau, 1994) following certain conditions (Imbeau, Pétry, & Lamari, 2001). The hypothesis of party influence is thus an important tool to understand the choices and results of public policies (Schmidt, 1996), especially when considering variations in results according to the area of policy and institutional designs (Blais, Blake, & Dion, 1993, 1996; Budge, Ezrow, & McDonald, 2010; Carlsen, 1997; Castles & McKinlay, 1979; Swank, 1988; Tavits & Letki, 2009).

The hypothesis that partisan ideology influences public policies depending on the area find support in studies dealing with the subnational level. According to Sørensen (1995), the allocation of resources between different public policies at the local level is influenced by the preferences of political parties. An analysis of the party effect on the investments level in Flemish municipalities corroborates this analysis (Goeminne & Smolders, 2014). However, in dealing with the policies developed by US municipalities, there was found a greater effect of the mayor's party on policies in which the division of competencies between the governmental levels is smaller (Gerber & Hopkins, 2011). In the case of the international subnational governments activities, a politics that is not electorally salient, the loss or gain of importance in the municipal agenda would vary in a stop and go logic (Vigevani, 2006), being important the presence of mayors entrepreneurs (Keating, 1999). However, observing the debate about the influence of parties on other policies, would not this logic explain the variation of the internationalization of subnational governments? In other words, does the ideology of the ruling party influence the decision of a subnational government to internationalize?

To test the hypothesis of party influence on the internationalization of subnational governments, the Brazilian municipalities constitute an interesting observation unit. Initially because they provide relative constitutional autonomy for the development of these activities (Lopes, 2006), despite the lack of clarity for many municipal administrations (IBGE, 2013). Another issue is the inequality between different policies at the subnational level according to central government regulation (Araújo & Flores, 2017; Arretche, 2013), and, in cases of greater autonomy, the salience

in the electoral debate (Araújo, 2014). For, in addition to these issues, to act mainly on issues that do not confront national foreign policy (Vigevani, 2006), high inequality is expected in the internationalization of the Brazilian municipalities. And part of this inequality can be explained by the difference in the ideology of the mayors' parties

However, great care must be taken to ensure misinterpretations. If what is pointed out as a difference of the PT (Salomon, 2011) is, in the end, a component of party organization, this will generate a bias for the left parties, not being an ideological issue. By basing its organization on bottom-up models, the PT differs from other parties by prioritizing its local organization, that is, in municipalities (Samuels & Zucco, 2015; Van Dyck, 2014), being the greater identification of voters with the party among all Brazilian parties a consequence (Samuels, 2006). Considering this alternative hypothesis, the applied treatments will be (1) left-wing parties, being centrist and right-wing its control; and (2) PT, being the control the other parties of the left-wing. With this, it will be possible to observe (1) whether there is a difference between the left-wing parties and the others points of ideological spectrum and (2) whether there is a difference between PT and the rest of the left-wing. In case of a difference between the PT and the other parties on the left, the hypothesis of ideology loses force and that of party organizational structure is strengthened.

Do political parties matter?

A step back is necessary before addressing the relationship between political parties and the internationalization of municipalities in Brazil, since two institutional characteristics must be emphasized. The first is the multiparty nature of the electoral system. In the analyzed period, for example, the legislative survey of Power and Zucco (2012a) contemplates 13 parties of the legislature⁵ of which 12 elected mayors for the period 2009-2012⁶. More than that, besides the 12 parties used in the analysis, another 12 had elected mayors⁷. In the same way, Brazilian federalism, loaded with the flag of administrative decentralization after the Federal Constitution of 1998, is closely related to the phenomenon. Being autonomous political units, the Brazilian municipalities have policies of exclusive and shared competence with other levels of government, and the internationalization is not sealed by the Constitution (Lopes, 2006). This relationship appears more clearly with the first processes of institutionalization in Brazilian municipalities dating precisely from the late 1980s (Nunes, 2005; Salomon, 2011).

Considering the international aspect of this policy, it is also necessary to deal with regional integration and globalization issues when establishing a relationship with party ideology. Concerning economic integration, left-wing parties and individuals presented greater restrictions to economic integration processes than right-wing (Budge, Robertson, & Hearl, 1987; Gabel, 1998). In the same sense, left-wing parties would tend to discourse supporting social welfare policies as a response to the effects of globalization (Burgoon, 2012). So why would the Brazilian left-wing parties would tend to internationalize more than the right-wing parties?

At first, PT draws attention because is considered a party with greater international vocation at the subnational level (Salomon, 2011). Indeed PT is a party which had a Secretariat of International Relations⁸ active over the last decades and, more than that, encouraged the development of


⁵PSOL, PC do B, PDT, PT, PSB, PPS, PV, PMDB, PSDB, PP, PTB, DEM e PR.

⁶PSOL did not elect mayors for the period.

⁷Although they do not appear in the legislative survey of Power and Zucco (2012a) such parties had prefectures.

⁸According to the 2001 statute, the PT held a Secretariat for International Relations until 2015 when became a Vice Presidency of International Relations (PT, 2001, 2008b).

Figure 1. Ideological distribution of Brazilian political parties for 2007-2010 term



Source: elaborated by the author from the standardized estimates of *Power and Zucco (2012b)*.

international activities in the municipalities that governed. A good example is the primer on the internationalization of municipalities directed to their candidates for mayor for the mandate 2009-2012:

"This contribution aims to sensitize and guide PT candidates about the importance of an international action by municipalities to make feasible or potentiate projects, to exchange good practices and to design national and international public policies, enabling the capture of resources and the attraction of investments and, above all, contributing to the definition and implementation of Brazilian foreign policy, giving support to the new local representatives - mayors and councilors - to follow the accumulated history of the Workers' Party and integrate the local to the national and the international with adequate information and strategic vision" (PT, 2008a, s/n)

This excerpt shows the desire for the development of international cooperation by "petistas" prefectures blending economic objectives. Secondly, it shows organizational yearnings with the formation of partisan-based leadership: a political goal, but not an ideological one per se. Proposal of bottom-up occupation of Mercosur, encouraging mayors to integrate the thematic axes of the cities networks linked to the bloc, Mercocities, from a discourse of democratization lies in a gray terrain between pragmatism and ideology. Apply to the block the structuring logic of the party or, in fact, to increase the instances of participation? Despite the absence at first, ideological aspects appear throughout the short text:

"Clearly assimilating the new reality of international relations, in which the Municipalities emerge as a new actor (...), the Party established clear guidelines for the international activities of the Prefectures. (...) 'the PT seeks to foster, in the Brazilian

people, values and practices of internationalist solidarity, with struggles for democracy, national sovereignty and social equality in all parts of the world'. At the same time, "the PT encourages the participation of its rulers, parliamentarians and activists at the World Social Forum (WSF), the Forum of Local Authorities (FLA) and the Forum of Local Authorities Peripheral (FALP), international public space to fight against neoliberalism'." (PT, 2008a, s/n).

While adopting a pragmatic approach at the beginning of the document, the development of the proposed activities takes on a more ideological character. In defining what the party expects in international activities, the defense is of common guidelines on the left-wing parties. Likewise, the forums highlighted in the document are events in which partisan leaders and movements linked to the left-wing meet. Finally, it cries out for the "struggle against neoliberalism". In this sense, this strategy demonstrates a background based, on the one hand, by organizational pragmatism and, on the other, of ideological aspects. Would exist points in common with other left-wing parties in Brazil?

One source to preliminary answers are the partisan statutes of the analyzed parties and whether is common the ideological component to left-wing parties. PDT (1999, 2015), which presents in the red rose of its party its relation with the Socialist International, had a Secretariat of International Relations between 1999 and 2015⁹. In addition to PT and PDT, PSOL (2005, 2015) also has a Secretariat for International Relations since 2015, and the contact with left-wing parties in other countries is one of the objectives of the structure. The PSB and PCdoB do not have organizational structures for international relations, but have in their objectives international interaction or cooperation with leftist movements and parties. In the case of PSB (1996, 2005, 2008, 2011), it explains the constant search for cooperation with international institutions and movements that have the same objectives of the party. Since 1999 PCdoB (1999, 2001, 2006, 2011) has established that it "educates its members in the spirit of proletarian internationalism and the international solidarity of the workers of all countries", a permanent mission despite some changes in the statute.

In the center of the party spectrum, only the PPS (1998, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2009, 2011, 2013) mentions discussions of international issues and respect to the constitutional guidelines of international relations¹⁰. The PV (2000, 2005, 2009, 2011) does not present any guideline to act internationally, although it had have an International Relations Secretariat from 2000 (extinct in 2009) and had brought the agenda to the National Executive in 2011. The PMDB (2013, 2015) and the PSDB (1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2013, 2015)¹¹ possess party-related research institutes that would be responsible for international and international cooperation issues.

When the analysis is displaced to the right-wing parties, the international agenda loses even more force. PP (2009, 2013, 2015) has only mentions of compliance with the constitutional norms of international relations. PTB (1999, 2009, 2010, 2012, 2014) has a vice president of International Relations, even if none of the objectives of the party is specified. In a previous period, the existence of a Secretariat of International Relations made mention to partnerships with foreign parties (PTB, 1999). In turn, PR (2006, 2009, 2010, 2012) and DEM (2007, 2008) have no mention of international relations in their statutes, even though the PR preach respect to International Relations constitutional rules in the Party Program annexed to the 2006 Statute (PR, 2006).

⁹After the period, the international relations of the party were in charge of the national executive without the definition of a secretariat (PDT, 2015).

¹⁰And even at the center of spectrum, the party has its origin in the Brazilian Communist Party.

¹¹PSDB counted on a Secretariat of International Relations until the statute of 2011.

Even if the statutory proposals and the parties international activities do not constitute an effective evidence, a greater concern of the Brazilian left-wing parties in interacting and cooperating with social movements and foreign parties is observed. It is a common point to the guidelines of the PT (2008a) for the international action of the "petistas" mayors, so that this sharing does not take place in a vacuum. Participation in more left-wing networks and events, such as the Forum of Local Peripheral Authorities and the World Social Forum, creates spaces for political discussion that contemplate the ideological component. When observed the statutes of the centrist parties, the PSDB and the PMDB when transferring responsibility to research institutes would be guided by a more technical cooperation action. On the right-wing, the absence of concern can represent the nationalist character present in their ARENA origin, official party of the Brazilian military dictatorship.

Thus, the discussion supports the hypotheses of the article. From the party statutes, the left-wing would have a greater bias to internationalize based on ideological issues, especially of solidarity and cooperation, when compared to the parties of centrist and right-wing. This gains strength with the discussion about the PT as a differentiated party in this aspect, although it opens up to an explanation for a greater internationalization of its municipalities based in their organizational structure. From this, the hypothesis that the PT is a party with greater propensity to the internationalization of municipalities brings two possibilities. If it does not differentiate itself from the other leftist parties, it strengthens the ideological hypothesis; if it differs, may indicate a bias in the analysis towards the left-wing caused by its differentiated organizational structure.

The next section will present the data and methods used to test the hypotheses, dividing into (i) a presentation of the database construction, (ii) the operationalization of treatment and (iii) outcome, and (iv) a presentation of characteristics of the international activities of the Brazilian municipalities.

Data and Methods

Aiming to observe if the ideology of the political party influences the international activities of Brazilian municipalities, a database was built based on the "Basic Survey on the Brazilian Municipalities of 2012"¹² (MUNIC 2012) (IBGE, 2013). MUNIC is a questionnaire sent to municipal managers almost every year since 2001 by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics¹³ (IBGE) and in the 2012 edition it had a section dedicated to international cooperation. In order to include the electoral data, CEPESP (2017) electoral data repository was used. In addition to better data organization, the inclusion of IBGE's municipality code in the base of the TSE allows the a more accurately cross. These data are essential for the construction of outcome and treatments variables. However, the database used has socioeconomic, political and geographic characteristics that could influence both the treatments and the outcome.

The socioeconomic variables are per capita income, Gini index and proportion of own municipal resources. The per capita income represents the level of economic development of the municipality which influences policies design implemented by the mayor and, with that, allows to identify the parties linked to them. The Gini index shows another aspect of economic development, since ideology and inequality influence policies in Brazil (Franzoni, 2008; Huber, Nielsen, Pribble, & Stephens, 2006), with more unequal municipalities having greater demand for public services. This, on the one hand, influences the decision-making of certain parties candidates, as well as in the

¹²Pesquisa Básica sobre os Municípios Brasileiros.

¹³Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística.

political priority for internationalization. The municipality's own resources are associated with the capacity to implement policies, being more possible, also the differentiation of priorities among the candidates of different parties (Beramendi, 2007; Rodrigues-Silveira, 2011).

The political variables are the participation in cities networks and the margin of victory of the elected mayor. The margin of victory of the elected mayor ends up influencing the order of priority of the policies (Boulding & Brown, 2014), since it is expected the attempt to continuity by incumbent. Participation in city networks is possibly the least intuitive confounder: even if the cost of participation is low, can generate negative or positive image in electoral disputes, depending on their political use and local priorities. Likewise, it does not represent the development of an international activity, since the entry often does not occur in the analyzed term - even though the previous participation may generate incentives for these activities.

Finally, the geographic variables are the geographical regions of IBGE, proportion of urban population and presence of border with neighboring countries. The region ends up condensing, in many ways, common geographical features that facilitate or hinder access to the exterior due to possible costs, as well as there are differentiations in the electoral alignment (Kerbauy, 2011). The proportion of the urban population is another measure of development and influences expectations about policies and the party-electoral game as a consequence. Lastly, the presence of borders creates ties with the subnational neighbors, since there are common problems (Aguirre, 1999), also influencing the electoral debate.

Thus, it is an original effort to use MUNIC to conduct empirical tests on the international activities of Brazilian municipalities. There are several possibilities for verification of hypotheses present in the literature that have not yet been verified with the aggregation of external variables present in other databases, as realized here¹⁴. Although concerns arise about the dedication employed to respond to the questionnaires, the simplified format with a large proportion of the answers as "yes" or "no" reduces the chances of error. To further minimize this concern, a conference was held in search of inconsistencies between some responses¹⁵. The absence of a time series to verify the permanence of the effect over time is a concern, but does not deconfigure the contribution of the analysis.

The variables of interest for research at MUNIC 2012 are: "Specific area for decentralized international cooperation (DIC) in its organizational structure", "The municipality receives some kind of international cooperation" and "The municipality provides some international cooperation". From them, two distinct outcomes were operationalized. The first is the presence of a structure of international relations within the prefecture as a dummy variabel indicating "yes" or "no". The second, also a dummy for "yes" and "no", indicates if the municipality has a subnational international activity. In this sense, it also contemplates municipalities that receive or provide cooperation with some foreign government or entity, even if they do not possess an area of international relations.

Considering the hypothesis of the influence of ideology on the international activities of subnational governments, the tests will be performed in two stages and, as a result, two different treatments will be used. At first, the treatment will be "Left-Wing Parties". In this sense, the left-wing and left-center parties were classified as treatment, and, as control, those of center, center-right and right (Power & Zucco, 2012b). With this, it will be possible to observe if there are differences

¹⁴The procedures for the construction of the database and the operationalization of the variables are explained in the Appendix A.

¹⁵In the replication archives, for example, the cross of responses and specifications was carried out to verify whether the international cooperation of the municipalities was not a result from a random response or lack of information.

between the left parties and the others for the two outcomes. In a second moment, the applied treatment is "PT": the municipalities governed by the PT shall be designated as treatment and the municipalities governed by the other left-wing parties shall be the control. In this way it is possible to identify if there is any difference between the PT and the other leftist parties on both outcomes. From this, it is possible to establish in a more reliable way if the effect of the left is ideological or derived from the differentiated organizational structure of the PT.

The application of treatment and control groups mirrors experimental designs, being that, in an ideal experiment, the distribution between treated and untreated municipalities would be randomized. This would create two groups of municipalities with very similar characteristics on average. However, the treatments used in the different tests are not randomly assigned and the treatment and control groups are not balanced. The most common alternative to deal with the limitations for the execution of this research design are the multivariate regression models, with treatment being a dummy variable. Even in an observational study, it is possible to think about designs that include the possible confounders and reach the balance between them.

To this aim, before applying the tests, the treatment and control groups will undergo a balancing process via genetic matching. The use of matching with a large volume of characteristics allows the measurement of the estimators of the treatment effect by creating a natural weighting scheme (Dehejia & Wahba, 2002). Genetic matching, in turn, is a multivariate method based on the search for algorithms to determine how each variable weighs, improving balance and reducing bias (Diamond & Sekhon, 2013).


From the indicated confounders, it is sought to match municipalities with similar characteristics that differ only by treatment. Thus, groups of "individuals" (municipalities) would be formed which are similar in all pre-treatment characteristics so that the difference in outcome represents the treatment effect (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). In order to perform the pairing, the package "MatchIt" (Ho, Imai, King, & Stuart, 2011) from R software was used, performing genetic matching algorithms and extracting post-balance samples. The creation of a sub-sample with correspondence between the treatment and control groups allows to indicate that the difference between the averages of the treatment and the control are unbiased estimators of the average treatment effect (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). In this sense, before entering the tests, it is important to present an overview of the international activities of Brazilian municipalities.

The international activities of Brazilian municipalities

The improvement caused by the balance between the groups is more evident when the political characteristics are observed. A first point of note is that the municipality acting internationally is a rare event. This is verified both to the measure of the specific area of cooperation, present in 2% of municipalities, and to the development of subnational international activities, in 3.6% of municipalities. A second point is the concentration of the phenomenon in the big cities. According to Figure 2, 18% of the municipalities between 100 and 500 thousand inhabitants have an international area in the administrative structure and 21.6% of them act internationally. In municipalities with more than 500 thousand inhabitants these rates reach 41.1% and 63.15% respectively. All other population ranges are below average for both measures, except for international activities in the range between 50 and 100 thousand inhabitants

Another indication of the predominance of the phenomenon in the largest municipalities is in the indicating the problems for the development of their international relations. The greater information about these problems in the municipalities with larger population is evident with the


Figure 2. Municipalities with International Cooperation Area and Subnational International Activity by Population Class in 2012 (%)



Source: elaborated by the author from MUNIC 2012 (IBGE, 2013).

observation of Figure 3. The highest response rates for any of the problems are in the range of municipalities above 500 thousand inhabitants. Likewise, the indication of the answer "does not know" leaves the tendency even more clear if interpreted as lack of knowledge about the politics by the municipal managers. In all the bands below 100 thousand inhabitants the response rate is above 60%, falling to 47.2% between 100 and 500 thousand inhabitants and to 18.42% in municipalities with more than 500 thousand inhabitants. With this, the inclusion of a variable for the size of the municipality having the population as a proxy is also necessary.


Figure 3. Problems for the internationalization of the municipality by problem and population class in 2012 (%)



Source: elaborated by the author from MUNIC 2012 (IBGE, 2013).

From the information in Figure 3, the main problems pointed out, related to lack of resources, would not be directly related to party guidelines. On the other hand, the absence of specific legislation and information available, the professionals capacitation, and the lack of human resources and political support/priority can be influenced by the parties. In the absence of legislation and specific information, parties can circulate documents that presents ways in which a municipality can be internationalized and the limitations of such actions. Training and lack of human resources, in turn, can be mitigated by the training of specialized cadres, either by recruiting or training in foundations maintained by political parties. Finally, the lack of support/political priority are closely linked to the parties' view on the possibility of internationalization of municipalities. In this sense, the partisan statutes have provided indications of the view that Brazilian political parties have on the possibilities of internationalization of subnational governments. In the same way, it is possible to observe whether or not there are incentives within the party structure so that international action is a policy encouraged by political parties.

Figure 4. Municipalities with Subnational International Activities and International Cooperation Area by political party in 2012 (%)




Source: elaborated by author from *MUNIC 2012* (IBGE, 2013) and election results for 2008 (CEPESP, 2017).

From the point of view of the first treatment, Figure 4 shows a greater tendency of left-wing parties to internationalization. When considering the areas of international relations, the PT and the PDT are well above average, while the PSB is slightly above average. PCdoB, in turn, does not have any area of international cooperation in the municipalities it governs. Similarly, for subnational international activities, PT and PDT are parties well above while PSB is somewhat below average. PC D B, once again, is well below average. The simple observation of the relative frequencies for the two outcomes suggests that, in fact, the ideological position of the party can influence the decision of internationalization of the Brazilian municipalities. In the same way, the PT is the party with the highest frequency of internationalization of its municipalities for both outcomes and only PDT is reasonably comparable. That in itself would be enough to say that the effects really exist?

The lack of balancing in the confounders indicates the impossibility of realizing any infer-

Figure 5. Confounders Balance for left treatment



Source: elaborated by author.

ence. Figure 5¹⁶ shows the balancing of the confounders before and after the completion of the genetic matching for the "Left-Wing" treatment. Among the geographic variables, the Southeast, Northeast and Midwest regions do not have a balance between the groups. The same happens with population, per capita GDP, Gini index and participation in city networks.

In this sense, before balancing, the municipalities governed by the left-wing are larger, poorer and more unequal with a strong presence in the Northeast and low in the Midwest. However, after genetic matching, all variables are balanced between treatment and control groups.

For the "PT" treatment, the lack of balancing occurs for an even greater number of variables according to Figure 6¹⁷. Only the margin of victory in the municipal elections, urban population proportion, Southern region and Gini index are balanced between the two groups before genetic matching.

Thus, when compared to municipalities governed by other leftist parties, the PT's are larger, richer and more unequal with a higher proportion of own revenues and with a greater presence in the Southeast and Midwest. After genetic matching, the improvement in balance is visible. All variables but the Northeast region are balanced after the procedure, even with great improvement.


In this sense, Figures 5 and 6 demonstrate the improvement in balance quality between the control and treatment groups for both treatments used in the analyzes of the next section. The observation of the imbalance of the groups indicates that the adoption of multivariate models would tend to produce biased estimators. Now, groups are expected to be statistically equal for these characteristics¹⁸, and although the use of matching does not guarantee the elimination of the omitted variable bias, the balance between the two groups brings greater robustness to the results (Seawright,

¹⁶The data that gave rise to the figure are in Table B1 of Appendix B.

¹⁷The data that gave rise to the figure are in Table B2 of Appendix B.

¹⁸In Tables B1 and B2 it is possible to observe the p-values for difference-in-means test and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for the continuous variables. In the same way, the last column shows the improvement in the quality of the balance.

Figure 6. Confounders Balance for PT treatment



Source: elaborated by author.

2016). In this sense, the use of simple difference-in-means tests would allow to estimate the average treatments effects with great bias reduction. However, confounders will be considered in regression models applied for (i) geographical, (ii) political, (iii) socioeconomic and (iv) all i, ii and iii. The regressions will be used as robustness tests to observe if the trend of the effects found with the difference-in-means tests remain with the inclusion of the confounders.

Analysis and results

Left-Wing Parties

With the difference-in-means tests, it is possible to estimate the ATE (average treatment effect) of the treatments on the two outcomes. The first tested hypothesis is that left-wing parties have a greater propensity to internationalization than centrist and right-wing parties. The results of the difference-in-means tests are shown in Table 1 with the results for "Left-Wing" treatment on the existence of areas of international cooperation and on the international activities of Brazilian municipalities. To observe the gain resulting from genetic matching, the tests were performed with the data before and after the procedure. The balanced sample has 2028 observations (1122 in the treatment group and 906 in the control group) among 4825 possible observations.

First two columns of Table 1 present the tests for the existence of international cooperation areas and the last two for international activities. In all of them the means differences are positive and significant at the 95% level. However, when comparing tests before and after matching, it is possible to observe the reduction of the average effect of the treatment after the confounders' balancing. This is the bias generated by imbalancing.

What draws attention to both outcomes is the dimension of the effect: in the first column "After Matching" the means difference is higher than the average of the control group; in the second, 0.011 smaller. If observed in isolated ways, the differences of 0.025 for the existence of international


Table 1
Two Sample T-Test for Left Treatment

	International Area		International Activities	
	Before Matching	After Matching	Before Matching	After Matching
Treatment Mean	0.046	0.046	0.067	0.067
Control Mean	0.015	0.021	0.030	0.039
Mean Difference	0.031	0.025	0.037	0.028
P-Value	0.000	0.002	0.000	0.005

Source: elaborated by author.

areas and 0.028 for international performance do not jump in the eyes. However, this difference is very substantive when put into perspective: the occurrence in the treatment group corresponds to 2.21 times for the international area and 1.72 for international activities when compared with control group. Thus, the effect of a municipality being governed by a left-wing party is more than double for the existence of international areas and close to double for international activities when compared to those with centrist and right-wing parties.

Figure 7. Marginal Effects for Left Treatment by Model



Source: elaborated by author.

Even with the results of difference-in-means tests indicating a greater propensity of the internationalization of municipalities governed by left-wing parties, the application of multivariate models, even after balancing, provides greater robustness to the results. Models 1 to 4 have the presence of an international cooperation area and from 5 to 8 the development of international activities by the municipalities as outcomes. The same treatment applied to the difference-in-means

tests, but now geographical controls have also been included¹⁹ (Models 1 and 5), political (Models 2 and 6), socioeconomic (Models 3 and 7). Models 4 and 8 contemplate all confounders²⁰. Would be the left-wing effect robust to all specifications?

Figure 7 shows the effect of the "Left-Wing" treatment for these eight models considering the Average Marginal Effects (AME) and confidence intervals limited by the vertical line at 0. The effects for all specifications are positive and statistically significant at the 95% level. For the presence of international cooperation structures, all models show that left-wing has near 2% more internationalized municipalities than centrist and right-wing parties for all specifications. For international activities, the AME is close to 2% too. The models confirm the trend of hypothesis testing, since the effect follows the same direction and are close to or even larger than in the difference-in-means tests. It is important to emphasize that the effects are also substantive, since they indicate increases close to 130% for international areas and 50% for international activities. Now, to verify whether this effect can be attributed to ideology or not, the same tests should be performed with the "PT" treatment.

PT: Workers Party

The second hypothesis to be tested is the PT's greater propensity to internationalize in front of the other leftist parties. Among the 1122 municipalities governed by leftist parties, the genetic matching algorithm selected 802 (510 in the control group and 292 in the treatment group). The ATEs are positive in all four tests but are not statistically significant after balancing and are substantially very small. The results of the "Before Matching" columns are highly substantive and statistically significant at 95% confidence. This indicates that more acutely than in the previous treatment the imbalance between the groups generates a bias that distort the results.

Table 2
Two Sample T-Test for PT Treatment

	International Area		Internationa Activities	
	Before Matching	After Matching	Before Matching	After Matching
Treatment Mean	0.061	0.061	0.088	0.088
Control Mean	0.034	0.051	0.049	0.079
Mean Difference	0.026	0.009	0.039	0.009
P-Value	0.036	0.582	0.009	0.644

Source: elaborated by author.


At first, the results after matching indicate that the PT does not differ from the other leftist parties for both outcomes. However, the fact that the groups are unbalanced to the variable that represents the Northeast region of the country the bias would not completely eliminate. Thus, in addition to the regression models used for the "Left-Wing" treatment, a first model will rely only on the control for the Northeast region, the only unbalanced confounder.

¹⁹The regions variables use the South as a reference for comparison.

²⁰Tables E1 and E2 of Appendix E present all coefficients of the eight models.

The models from 9 to 13 have the presence of international cooperation areas as an outcome and those from 14 to 18, international subnational activities. Models 9 and 14 include only the "Northeast" variable, unbalanced between treatment and control groups. The other models follow the same procedures applied for the "Left-Wing" treatment: Models 10 and 15 include geographic controls; 11 and 16, political controls; 12 and 17 socioeconomic factors; and 13 and 18 all confounders. The results corroborate with the results found in difference-in-means tests: PT does not differ from the other left-wing parties in any of the specifications. More than not having statistical significance at the 95% level, the direction AMEs vary: in some models it is less than 0, in others larger²¹

Figure 8. Marginal Effects for PT by Model



Source: elaborated by author.

In this way, the two-step analysis, comparing the left-wing parties with the centrist and right-wing parties in a first moment and the PT with the other leftist parties in a second moment, indicates that ideology has implications for the internationalization of Brazilian municipalities. For both the presence of international cooperation areas and international activities, the left-wing effect is positive and statistically significant both in the difference-in-means tests and for all eight different specifications for the regressions. Conversely, the PT was not different from the other leftist parties, both in difference-in-means tests and in all ten regression specifications. With this, the internationalization of PT municipalities is not different from the other left-wing parties because of their organizational differences. This result is in line with the effect of the ideological positioning of the leftist parties as explanation for their greater internationalization when compared to centrist and right-wing parties.

²¹Tables F1 and F2 of Appendix F present all coefficients of the eight models.

Conclusion and implications

Party's ideology affect its chances of developing international activities at the subnational level? Evidence of the Brazilian case suggest that yes. Observing both the presence of structures for international relations and international activities considering international cooperation without specific bureaucracy, the left-wing parties are more active in the municipalities. Using difference-in-means tests and varied regression specifications after balancing tgroups with genetic matching, the chances of internationalization remain substantially higher in municipalities governed by leftist parties.

When considered a secondary hypothesis that (i) PT is the party that most develops these activities at the municipal level, an alternative explanation that (ii) the difference would be result of PT's differentiated organizational structure emerges. With this, the same procedures were carried out when comparing the party with the others from the left of the political spectrum. The secondary hypothesis was rejected, eliminating the alternative explanation. So, the conclusions go to the studies that show differences in public policies at the local level from the ideology of the ruling party.

However, two points from these results need special attention. First, although MUNIC brings the possibility of analyzing the existing internationalization of municipalities, it is not possible to carry out a more qualitative analysis of these actions. In general, leftist parties are active in different forms of cooperation²² and with all kind of actors (public, private or non-governmental). In the case of governments partners, it is also not possible to establish a trend due to the low number of cases. However, this qualitative gain would not alter the trend of greater international activism of municipalities governed by left-wing parties on different fronts. Likewise, the single application of the questionnaire does not allow to infer if this is a trend over time, although the presented photograph corroborates with internationalist view of the Brazilian left-wing.

From a comparative perspective, it is possible to verify the effect of party ideology on the internationalization of subnational governments in other institutional contexts. In the South American, for example, municipal engagement in the process of integration of Mercosur is broadly known. Whether with the creation of the Mercocities Network or the construction of a space for discussion and policies diffusion, the FCCR (Consultative Forum of Municipalities, Federated States, Provinces and Departments of Mercosur), municipalities seek an active participation in the bloc, although its participation takes place in an advisory role (Cornago, 1999; Milani & Ribeiro, 2011; Salomon, 2011). The same can be said about the Committee of the Regions from European Union, which counts on the participation of local and regional governments which are consulted about local impact of changes in European legislation. Bringing the ideological aspect of the international action of these governments to the debate generates gains for the debate. Not only nationalist and separatist movements seek to legitimize themselves internationally.

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²²Tables D2, D1, D3 and D4 of Appendix D present the partners from all municipalities who have declared that they have international cooperation and the area of these actions.

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Appendix A Data Construction

It is extremely important to present the data sources and the way the variables were operationalized for the analyzes.

From the point of view of the sources, the Profile of Brazilian Municipalities in 2012 (MUNIC 2012) (IBGE, 2013) provided data for the construction of the response variable and of several confounders including: (a) presence of an area of international cooperation in the municipality; (b) municipalities that receive some international cooperation; (c) municipalities that provide some international cooperation; (d) geographic region of IBGE; (e) estimated population for 2012 and (f) participation in city networks. The electoral data were obtained through API from CEPESP (2017), allowing the votes for all candidates be crossed for the 2008 elections with the IBGE municipal code. Data on the Gini index for households, the municipalities in the border area and the proportion of the urban population in the municipality are from IBGE and are available on the DATASUS platform.(?). Revenues from municipalities refer to Municipal Finances published annually by ?. Given the data sources, the next step is to show how the variables were operationalized.

- **Outcome 1 - Structure of international relations:** A dummy variable indicating the existence of an area of international cooperation in the municipal bureaucracy. Assumes a value of 1 when the question "Specific area for decentralized international cooperation (DIC) in its organizational structure?" receives as answer: (a) "Secretary (with its own budget)", (b) "Secretary (without budget)", (c) "Coordination/Advisory", (d) "International Advisor (specific person responsible for decentralized international cooperation)", (e) "Non-specific advisor (person accompanying decentralized international cooperation)", (f) "Person who accumulates the international theme with other activities" or (g) "Others". For all other answers, the outcome assumes a value of 0.
- **Outcome 2 - Subnational international activities:** Another dummy variable that indicates if municipality develops international activities. Assumes the value of 1 when "Outcome 1" is 1 or when the answer for questions "The municipality receives some kind of international cooperation?" or "The municipality provides some international cooperation?" is "Yes". If answers for both questions are "No" or "Outcome 1" is 0, the value is 0.
- **Treatment 1 - Left-Wing Parties:** Both treatments indicate the mayors' parties that won the 2008 elections, that is, parties of mayors who won the elections to govern until 2012, survey year. In this case, is a dummy variable that indicates whether the party is from left-wing (left and center-left) or from centrist or right-wing (center-right and right). The Power and Zucco (2012b) ideological index was used for classification, with standardized values below -0.5 classified as left-wing (1) and above -0.5 as centrist and right-wing (0).
- **Treatment 2 - Workers Party (PT):** Following the classification of "Treatment 1", the municipalities governed by the PT were classified as 1 and by the other leftist parties as 0.
- **Confounder 1 - Per capita GDP:** Per capita GDP for Brazilian municipalities in thousands of Reais.
- **Confounder 2 - Gini index:** Gini index of per capita household income according to the 2010 Census.

- **Confounder 3 - Proportion of own municipal resources:** Division of the difference between total revenue and transfer revenue by total revenue:

$$OR = \frac{R - T}{R}$$

where OR is the proportion of own revenues, R the total revenue and T the transfer revenue.

- **Confounder 4 - Participation in city networks:** The present or previous participation in city networks is marked as dummies according to the response of the municipal manager.
- **Confounder 5 - Victory margin of elected mayor:** The proportional difference between first and second place in municipal elections.

$$M = F - S$$

where M is the victory margin, F is the share of votes of elected mayor and S the share of second place in the election.

- **Confounder 6 - Geographic Region of IBGE:** Each of the regions (North, Northeast, Midwest, Southeast and South) was operationalized as a dummy variable, being marked as 1 when the municipality belongs to the region and 0 when it does not belong.
- **Confounder 7 - Proportion of Urban Population:** Proportion (between 0 and 1) of municipality population that lives in urban areas.
- **Confounder 8 - Border area with neighboring countries:** A dummy variable marked as 1 when the municipality borders another country and 0 when it does not.

All operationalization of variables and database construction procedures are available in the replication script. Also available are the download links of each of the original sources and all the transformations performed before the statistical analyzes.

Appendix B
Matching Balance

Table B1
Balance Before and After Matching - Left


Variable	Treatment	Control	Std. Diff.	p-value	KS	Reduction
Midwest (Before Matching)	0.048	0.098	-0.177	0.000	-	-
Midwest (After Matching)	0.048	0.053	-0.020	0.648	-	100.000
North (Before Matching)	0.076	0.073	0.010	0.773	-	-
North (After Matching)	0.076	0.072	0.013	0.767	-	100.000
Northeast (Before Matching)	0.382	0.280	0.225	0.000	-	-
Northeast (After Matching)	0.382	0.366	0.034	0.444	-	100.000
South (Before Matching)	0.214	0.235	-0.050	0.142	-	-
South (After Matching)	0.214	0.211	0.006	0.890	-	100.000
Southeast (Before Matching)	0.280	0.315	-0.075	0.027	-	-
Southeast (After Matching)	0.280	0.298	-0.040	0.371	-	100.000
Border Area (Before Matching)	0.129	0.102	0.087	0.010	-	-
Border Area (After Matching)	0.129	0.120	0.026	0.553	-	100.000
Gini (Before Matching)	0.511	0.498	0.201	0.000	0.496	-
Gini (After Matching)	0.511	0.507	0.060	0.176	0.841	86.511
Network (Before Matching)	0.042	0.017	0.164	0.000	-	-
Network (After Matching)	0.042	0.032	0.053	0.231	-	100.000
Own Revenue (Before Matching)	0.101	0.096	0.040	0.242	0.972	-
Own Revenue (After Matching)	0.101	0.102	-0.003	0.944	0.931	72.872
Per capita GDP (log) (Before Matching)	2.442	2.522	-0.114	0.001	0.100	-
Per capita GDP (log) (After Matching)	2.442	2.438	0.006	0.897	0.887	86.568
Population (log) (Before Matching)	9.681	9.381	0.255	0.000	0.552	-
Population (log) (After Matching)	9.681	9.601	0.065	0.144	0.992	100.000
Urban population (%) (Before Matching)	0.652	0.645	0.032	0.352	0.556	-
Urban population (%) (After Matching)	0.652	0.649	0.013	0.767	0.932	76.453
Win Margin (Before Matching)	0.148	0.150	-0.012	0.725	0.534	-
Win Margin (After Matching)	0.148	0.147	0.006	0.891	0.957	100.000

Table B2

Balance Before and After Matching - PT

Variable	Treatment	Control	Std. Diff.	p-value	KS	Reduction
Midwest (Before Matching)	0.069	0.031	0.176	0.003	-	-
Midwest (After Matching)	0.069	0.043	0.110	0.140	-	100.000
North (Before Matching)	0.102	0.054	0.182	0.002	-	-
North (After Matching)	0.102	0.096	0.020	0.792	-	100.000
Northeast (Before Matching)	0.247	0.495	-0.527	0.000	-	-
Northeast (After Matching)	0.247	0.320	-0.165	0.027	-	100.000
South (Before Matching)	0.237	0.194	0.104	0.082	-	-
South (After Matching)	0.237	0.249	-0.028	0.709	-	100.000
Southeast (Before Matching)	0.345	0.225	0.269	0.000	-	-
Southeast (After Matching)	0.345	0.292	0.114	0.126	-	100.000
Border Area (Before Matching)	0.153	0.109	0.130	0.031	-	-
Border Area (After Matching)	0.153	0.142	0.030	0.689	-	100.000
Gini (Before Matching)	0.509	0.513	-0.052	0.381	0.329	-
Gini (After Matching)	0.509	0.511	-0.023	0.752	0.916	86.511
Network (Before Matching)	0.063	0.025	0.192	0.001	-	-
Network (After Matching)	0.063	0.043	0.087	0.240	-	100.000
Own Revenue (Before Matching)	0.115	0.090	0.180	0.003	0.760	-
Own Revenue (After Matching)	0.115	0.104	0.080	0.283	0.860	72.872
Per capita GDP (log) (Before Matching)	2.546	2.355	0.269	0.000	0.482	-
Per capita GDP (log) (After Matching)	2.546	2.473	0.106	0.155	0.965	86.568
Population (log) (Before Matching)	9.793	9.587	0.163	0.007	0.596	-
Population (log) (After Matching)	9.793	9.678	0.088	0.236	0.797	100.000
Urban population (%) (Before Matching)	0.666	0.640	0.117	0.051	0.036	-
Urban population (%) (After Matching)	0.666	0.652	0.060	0.416	0.090	76.453
Win Margin (Before Matching)	0.148	0.148	-0.006	0.921	0.008	-
Win Margin (After Matching)	0.148	0.147	0.003	0.973	0.062	100.000


Figure B1. Density plot of expected values of treatment and control groups



Source: elaborated by the author.


Appendix C Descriptive Plots

Figure C1. Means with confidence intervals for International Subnational Activities and International Cooperation Areas by Party




Source: elaborated by author from MUNIC 2012 (IBGE, 2013) and election results for 2008 (CEPESP, 2017).

Figure C2. Problems for the internationalization of the municipality by problem and population class in 2012 (means with confidence intervals)



Source: elaborated by the author from MUNIC 2012 (IBGE, 2013).

Figure C3. International Subnational Activities and International Cooperation Areas by Population Class (means with confidence interval)



Source: elaborated by author from MUNIC 2012 (IBGE, 2013).

Appendix D Cooperation Partners

Table D1
Municipalities that receive NGO cooperation

State	Municipality	Party	Partner
PR	TRES BARRAS DO PARANA	DEM	PASTORAL DA CRIANÇA

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SC	ASCURRA	DEM	SCHOOL OF ENGINEERING-DA SUÉCIA, BÖRAS ENERGI OCH MILJÖ
SP	SANTANA DE PARNAIBA	DEM	MERCOCIUDADES
SP	SAO PAULO	DEM	BANCO MUNDIAL E UNIAO EUROPEIA
TO	SAO SALVADOR DO TOCANTINS	DEM	OPERAÇÃO MATO GROSSO
BA	JUAZEIRO	PC do B	UNICEF
PA	SENADOR JOSE PORFIRIO	PMDB	WORLD WIDE FUND - WWF BRASIL
PR	CATANDUVAS	PMDB	PASTORAL E ROTARI
PR	FIGUEIRA	PMDB	ROCCO E URBAL
RS	FREDERICO WESTPHALEN	PMDB	COOPERATIVAS DE TURISMO
SC	APIUNA	PMDB	SCHOOL OF ENGINEERING-DA SUÉCIA, BÖRAS ENERGI OCH MILJÖ
SC	BENEDITO NOVO	PMDB	SCHOOL OF ENGINEERING-DA SUÉCIA, BÖRAS ENERGI OCH MILJÖ
SP	GUARUJA	PMDB	PROGRAMA BANDEIRA AZUL
AL	INHAPI	PMN	VISÃO MUNDIAL
BA	SANTA RITA DE CASSIA	PP	GRUPO AMIZADE DA ITÁLIA
MT	RESERVA DO CABACAL	PP	ONG WWF BRASIL
SC	DOUTOR PEDRINHO	PP	SCHOOL OF ENGINEERING-DA SUÉCIA, BÖRAS ENERGI OCH MILJÖ
SC	POMERODE	PP	SCHOOL OF ENGINEERING-DA SUÉCIA, BÖRAS ENERGI OCH MILJÖ
SC	RIO DOS CEDROS	PP	SCHOOL OF ENGINEERING-DA SUÉCIA, BÖRAS ENERGI OCH MILJÖ
SC	RODEIO	PP	SCHOOL OF ENGINEERING-DA SUÉCIA, BÖRAS ENERGI OCH MILJÖ
MG	PATROCINIO	PPS	FUNDAÇÃO ROTÁRIA
PR	UBIRATA	PPS	WORD FAMILY ORGANIZATION
SP	DESCALVADO	PPS	SVILUPPUMBRIA SPA
AM	BENJAMIN CONSTANT	PR	ONG ITALINA ISCOS
ES	VILA VELHA	PR	CAMERA DE COMERCIO E IND DE SÃO PETERSBURGO
GO	SAO JOAO D'ALIANCA	PR	INSTITUTO BOBY MOORE
MG	MINAS NOVAS	PR	PAN DI ZUCCHERO
AC	EPITACIOLANDIA	PSB	USAID - EUA E CARE - UNIÃO EUROPEIA (HOLANDA)
MG	BELO HORIZONTE	PSB	CLINTON FOUNDATION / ITDP / WWF
MS	PONTA PORA	PSDB	ONG PAZ Y DESAROLLO
SP	BARBOSA	PSDB	AMICI DI MATTEO
SP	JUNDIAI	PSDB	NIPO - JUNDIAI - CIRCOLO ITALIANO
SP	SAO JOSE DOS CAMPOS	PSDB	UNESCO-ORG DAS NAÇÕES UN. PARA EDUC.
AC	ASSIS BRASIL	PT	USAID - EUA E CARE - UNIÃO EUROPÉIA
AC	BRASILEIA	PT	USAID-EUA E CARE-UNIÃO EUROPEIA
AC	CAPIXABA	PT	USAID-EUA / CARE - UNIÃO EUROPEIA
AC	XAPURI	PT	USAID - EUA E CARE-UNIÃO EUROPEIA
CE	ICAPUI	PT	FUNDAÇÃO BRASIL CIDADÃO
MG	CONTAGEM	PT	FLACMA
MG	MARLIERIA	PT	ONU
SC	GASPAR	PT	SCHOOL OF ENGINEERING-DA SUÉCIA, BÖRAS ENERGI OCH MILJÖ
SP	VARZEA PAULISTA	PT	SLUN DWELLER INTERNATIONAL
TO	COLINAS DO TOCANTINS	PT	TROCAIRE
PA	SAO FELIX DO XINGU	PTB	THE NATURAL CONSERVASY

Table D2

Municipalities that receive governmental (Countries, States, Municipalities, International Organizations) cooperation

State	Municipality	Party	Partners
TO	PONTE ALTA DO TOCANTINS	DEM	JICA - AGÊNCIA DE COOPERAÇÃO INTERNACIONAL JAPONESA
BA	BONITO	DEM	ATM TEXAS ADM UNIVERSITY
SP	RIBEIRAO PRETO	DEM	MERCOCIUDADES
SP	SANTANA DE PARNAIBA	DEM	MERCOCIUDADES- SECRETARIA EXECUTIVA
PE	CARUARU	PDT	PREFEITURA MUNICIPAL DE HOF-ALEMANHA
PR	PARANAGUA	PDT	BANCO INTERNACIONAL DE DESENVOLVIMENTO
RS	CHARQUEADAS	PDT	UNESCO
RS	PASSO FUNDO	PDT	BANCO INTERAMERICANO DE DESENVOLVIMENTO
MS	AGUA CLARA	PDT	CONSULADO JAPONÊS
CE	AQUIRAZ	PMDB	UNICEF
PE	ABREU E LIMA	PMDB	GOVERNO VENEZUELANO

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PE	MORENO	PMDB	UNION IBEROAMEROAMERICANA DE MUNICIPALISTAS
BA	SALVADOR	PMDB	UNIÃO EUROPEIA
MG	OURO PRETO	PMDB	UNESCO
RJ	MACAE	PMDB	GHP/CAMARASINTERNACIONAIS/AGÊNCIAS
SP	ARARAQUARA	PMDB	UNIÃO EUROPÉIA
SP	BARUERI	PMDB	CÂMARAS DE COMÉRCIO INTERNACIONAL
SP	SANTOS	PMDB	UNIÃO EUROPÉIA
SP	SAO JOSE DO RIO PARDO	PMDB	ROTAY CLUBE
PR	NOVA ESPERANCA	PMDB	CONSULADO DO JAPÃO
RS	ALEGRETE	PMDB	COMUNIDADE EUROPÉIA
RS	CAXIAS DO SUL	PMDB	CORPORAÇÃO ANDINA DE FOMENTO - CAF
RS	PORTO ALEGRE	PMDB	UN GLOBAL COMPACT CITIES PROGRAM
RS	SANTA MARIA	PMDB	BANCO MUNDIAL
GO	GOIANIA	PMDB	BANCO INTERAMERICANO DE DESENVOLVIMENTO
RJ	CACHOEIRAS DE MACACU	PP	CONSULADO JAPONES
PR	TOLEDO	PP	BID E AFD
MG	PATROCINIO	PPS	COMUNIDADE EUROPÉIA
AM	BENJAMIN CONSTANT	PR	ONG ITALIANA ISCOS
CE	GUARAMIRANGA	PR	WORLD FAMOUS MOUNTAINS ASSOCIATION
MG	FRUTAL	PR	UNESCO E IHE - INSTITUTE OF HIDROGRAPHIC EDUCATION
RJ	SAO JOAO DE MERITI	PR	BID- BANCO INTERNACIONAL DE DESENVOLVIMENTO
MT	MARCELANDIA	PR	PNUD - PROG DAS NAÇÕES UNIDAS
AC	EPITACIOLANDIA	PSB	SERVIÇO DE COOPERAÇÃO ALEMÃ - GIZ
MG	BELO HORIZONTE	PSB	UNIÃO EUROPEIA
SP	TABOAO DA SERRA	PSB	BANCO INTERAMERICANO DE DESENVOLVIMENTO
RS	CACHOEIRINHA	PSB	FUNDO DA BACIA DO PRATA
RS	ROSARIO DO SUL	PSB	COMUNIDADE EUROPÉIA
RS	SANT' ANA DO LIVRAMENTO	PSB	COMUNIDADE EUROPÉIA
AL	POCO DAS TRINCHEIRAS	PSC	AGÊNCIA ESPANHOLA DE COOP INTERERENCIONAL PARA O DESENVOLVIMENTO
RR	RORAINOPOLIS	PSDB	CONSULADO JAPONES
CE	PACAJUS	PSDB	UNICEF
SP	CATANDUVA	PSDB	BANCO INTERNACIONAL DE DESENVOLVIMENTO
SP	JUNDIAI	PSDB	JCIF - IWAKUNI - CONSULADOS
SP	SAO JOSE DOS CAMPOS	PSDB	BID - BANCO INTERAMERICANO DE DESENVOLVIMENTO
SP	SOROCABA	PSDB	UNESCO
PR	CURITIBA	PSDB	JICA, BIO, BIRD, AFD, FOMPLATA
PR	GUARATUBA	PSDB	ASSOC.DE AVANÇOS AMBIENTAIS DE HYOGO
RS	URUGUAIANA	PSDB	BIRD
MS	PONTA PORÁ	PSDB	UNIÃO EUROPÉIA
AC	ASSIS BRASIL	PT	SERVIÇO DE COOPERAÇÃO ALEMÃ - GIZ
AC	BRASILEIA	PT	SERVIÇO DE COOPERAÇÃO ALEMÃ-GIZ
AC	CAPIXABA	PT	SERVIÇO DE COOPERAÇÃO ALEMÃ - GIZ
AC	XAPURI	PT	SERVIÇO DE COOPERAÇÃO ALEMÃ - GIZ
CE	FORTALEZA	PT	COMUNIDADE EUROPÉIA/ ITALIA
PE	RECIFE	PT	MERCOCIDADES UNIÃO EUROPÉIA
BA	CAMACARI	PT	EMPRESAS INTERNACIONAIS
MG	CONTAGEM	PT	REDE MERCOCIDADES
MG	CORDISBURGO	PT	ORGANIZAÇÃO MUNDIAL DE TURISMO
ES	VITORIA	PT	BANCO INTERAMERICANO DE DESEN
SP	GUARULHOS	PT	MERCOCIDADES E UNIÃO EUROPEIA
SP	HORTOLANDIA	PT	CAF - COOPERAÇÃO ANDINA DE FOMENTO
SP	VARZEA PAULISTA	PT	UNIÃO EUROPÉIA
RS	BAGE	PT	UNIÃO IBEROAMERICANA DE MUNICIPALISTAS (UIM)
RS	NOVO HAMBURGO	PT	BID
GO	BURITI ALEGRE	PT	ORG. MUNDIAL DE EST. MUNICIPIOS E PROVINCIAS
PA	SAO FELIX DO XINGU	PTB	COMUNIDADE EUROPÉIA
PB	QUEIMADAS	PTB	UNIVERSIDADE DE TORONTO

Table D3

Municipalities that receive private actors cooperation

State	Municipality	Party	Partner
SC	ASCURRA	DEM	PRODUTORA DE ENERGIA TÉRMICA DA SUÉCIA.
PE	CARUARU	PDT	BERUFLICHE FORTBILOUNGSZENTREN DER WIRTSCHAFT-BFZ
MG	OURO PRETO	PMDB	BANCO DO ESPIRITO SANTO
PI	PAULISTANA	PMDB	CELTA
RS	FREDERICO WESTPHALEN	PMDB	AGÊNCIAS DE TURISMO
RS	SANTA MARIA	PMDB	ACLIMA - CLUSTER DE SUSTENTABILIDADE
SC	APIUNA	PMDB	PRODUTORA DE ENERGIA TÉRMICA DA SUÉCIA.
SC	BENEDITO NOVO	PMDB	PRODUTORA DE ENERGIA TÉRMICA DA SUÉCIA.
SP	BARUERI	PMDB	SÃO PAULO CONVENTION VISITOR / CÂMARA DE COM E ASS
MG	CATUTI	PP	MONSANTO
SC	DOUTOR PEDRINHO	PP	PRODUTORA DE ENERGIA TÉRMICA DA SUÉCIA.
SC	POMERODE	PP	PRODUTORA DE ENERGIA TÉRMICA DA SUÉCIA.
SC	RIO DOS CEDROS	PP	PRODUTORA DE ENERGIA TÉRMICA DA SUÉCIA.
SC	RODEIO	PP	PRODUTORA DE ENERGIA TÉRMICA DA SUÉCIA.
PB	JOAO PESSOA	PSB	BANCO INTERAMERICANO PARA O DESENVOLVIMENTO - BID
MG	ALAGOA	PSDB	TURISMO EXECUTIVO
PE	ITAPISSUMA	PSDB	FUNDAÇÃO ALCOA
SP	JUNDIAI	PSDB	VARIAS EMPRESAS E ENTIDADES
SP	SOROCABA	PSDB	INTERNATIONAL ASS.OF SCIENCE PARKS
MG	ANDRADAS	PT	ALCOA S/A
MG	LAMBARI	PT	FUNDAÇÃO HANS NEWMAN
SC	GASPAR	PT	PRODUTORA DE ENERGIA TÉRMICA DA SUÉCIA.
TO	COLINAS DO TOCANTINS	PT	IGREJA CATOLICA
MG	LIMA DUARTE	PV	ENTABAM

Table D4

Municipalities that offer cooperation for another governments

State	Municipality	Party	Partner	Area
BA	BONITO	DEM	USA TEXAS	EDUCAÇÃO
SC	BLUMENAU	DEM	VÁRIOS PAÍSES (17 PAÍSES)	ENSINO SUPERIOR E PESQUISA
SP	SANTANA DE PARNAIBA	DEM	CIDADES MEMBROS DO MERCOCIUDADES	EMPREGO E DESENVOLVIMENTO ECONOMICO
SP	SÃO PAULO	DEM	FRANCA, HOLANDA, POLONIA, EUA, ETC.	CULTURA, MEIO AMBIENTE, HABITACAO, ETC.
PE	CARUARU	PDT	HOF-ALEMANHA	SÓCIO-AMBIENTAL
PR	FOZ DO IGUAÇU	PDT	ARGENTINA E PARAGUAI	MIGRAÇÕES
PR	PARANAGUA	PDT	JAPÃO E UCRÂNIA	TÉCNICAS DIVERSAS
PR	PATO BRANCO	PDT	POSADAS - ARGENTINA	TECNOLOGIA DA INFORMAÇÃO E COMUNICAÇÃO
PR	SABAUDIA	PDT	ITÁLIA	CULTURA
RS	CHARQUEADAS	PDT	CHILE - SAN FRANCISCO DE MOSTAZAL	EDUCAÇÃO
RS	ELDORADO DO SUL	PDT	ELDORADO DAS MISSÕES NA ARGENTINA	CULTURAL.
SP	INDAIATUBA	PDT	PORTUGAL, ITÁLIA	COMÉRCIO EXTERIOR
MG	OURO PRETO	PMDB	ARGENTINA PORTUGAL E FRANÇA	CULTURAL
MG	SÃO JOAQUIM DE BICAS	PMDB	KITAKYUSHU - JAPÃO	TRATAMENTO DE LIXO
PE	ABREU E LIMA	PMDB	VENEZUELA	SAÚDE
PR	CAPANEMA	PMDB	ARGENTINA/PROVINCIA DE MISSIONES/ANDREZITO	CULTURAL
PR	LAPA	PMDB	ITÁLIA/VENETO/ISTRANA	CULTURAL E HISTÓRICA
RJ	MACAE	PMDB	SUÉCIA/BORAS	GESTÃO DE RESÍDUOS
RS	BOM PRINCÍPIO	PMDB	A1.RHEINLAND.PFALS	CULTURAL
RS	FREDERICO WESTPHALEN	PMDB	ARGENTINA/ MISSIONES E CORRIENTES	TURISMO E CULTURA
RS	PORTO ALEGRE	PMDB	MOÇAMBIQUE	REASSENTAMENTO URBANO E GESTÃO
RS	QUARAI	PMDB	URUGUAI	EDUCAÇÃO
RS	SANTA MARIA	PMDB	ESPANHA/BILBAO	SUSTENTABILIDADE
SC	BALNEARIO CAMBORIU	PMDB	CHILE	VULNERABILIDADE
SP	GUARUJA	PMDB	DINAMARCA	EDUCAÇÃO
GO	FORMOSA	PP	ALCA	ALIMENTAÇÃO ESCOLAR
RS	IVOTI	PP	ALEMANHA-ROTTENBUCH	EDUCAÇÃO-INTERCÂMBIO ALEMÃO
RS	PELOTAS	PP	PORTUGAL/ AVEIRA	FEIRAS EXPOSIÇÕES FENAD
RS	PORTO XAVIER	PP	SAN JAVIER-MNES-AR	COMÉRCIO, SERVIÇO E TURISMO
SC	SÃO FRANCISCO DO SUL	PP	FRANÇA/NORMANDIA/HONFLEUR	CULTURAL E TURISTICA
PR	UBIRATA	PPS	GENEIRA	SOCIAL
RS	BUTIA	PPS	SAN FRANCISCO DE MOSTAZAL -CHILE	CULTURAL
SP	DESCALVADO	PPS	ITÁLIA/UMBRIA	DESENVOLVIMENTO ECONOMICO
ES	VILA VELHA	PR	CHINA, ARGENTINA E RUSSIA	PORTUARIA E TECNOLOGIA INSTITUCIONAL
MG	FRUTAL	PR	ESTADOS UNIDOS	ESTUDOS HIDROGRAFICOS
MS	CARACOL	PR	SAN CARLO - PY	SAUDE
MT	MARCELANDIA	PR	NORUEGA	MEIO AMBIENTE - CADASTRO AMBIENTAL RURAL
MG	BELO HORIZONTE	PSB	HAITI	MOBILIDADE
RS	ROSARIO DO SUL	PSB	COMUNIDADE EUROPEIA	PRESERVAÇÃO AMBIENTAL

RS	SANT'ANA DO LIVRAMENTO	PSB	COMUNIDADE EUROPEIA	PRESERVAÇÃO AMBIENTAL
MS	PONTA PORÁ	PSDB	PARAGUAI/PEDRO JUAN CABALLERO	URBANIZAÇÃO/MEIO AMBIENTE
PR	CURITIBA	PSDB	COLÔMBIA - DEPARTAMENTO DE TLIMA	HABITAÇÃO
RS	URUGUAIANA	PSDB	ARGENTINA - CORRIENTES - PASSO DE LOS LIBRES	EDUCAÇÃO E SAÚDE
SC	CRICIUMA	PSDB	CHINA/ANHUI/HUAIBEI	DESENVOLVIMENTO ECONOMICO
SP	JUNDIAI	PSDB	RUANDA	ESPORTIVA
SP	SOROCABA	PSDB	ANIANG-COREIA	DIVERSAS
AC	ASSIS BRASIL	PT	BOLÍVIA E PERU	LEGISLAÇÃO E NA AREA DE CIDADANIA
AC	SANTA ROSA DO PURUS	PT	PERU	TRANSPORTE DE MERCADORIAS
BA	CAMACARI	PT	FRANÇA CHINA ITÁLIA COREIA	TECNOLOGIA
CE	FORTALEZA	PT	BENIN, PORTO NOVO	FORMAÇÃO P/ CONSERVAÇÃO DO PATRIM. HIST. E CULT.
ES	VITORIA	PT	DUNKERQUE FRANÇA	DESENVOLVIMENTO ECONÔMICO
GO	BURITI ALEGRE	PT	ESPAÑA/MADRI	INTERCAMBIO SOCIAL E COMERCIAL
MG	CONTAGEM	PT	HAITI	FORMAÇÃO PROFISSIONAL - EDUCAÇÃO
MS	CORUMBA	PT	BOLÍVIA - CIDADES FRONTEIRIÇAS	SAÚDE - EDUCAÇÃO
PE	RECIFE	PT	NANTES-FR GUANEZHOU-CHINA PORTO	CULTURA - EDUCAÇÃO DESENV. ECONOMICO
RS	BAGE	PT	REPUBLICA ORIENTAL DO URUGUAY	INTEGRAÇÃO FRONTEIRA
RS	BENTO GONCALVES	PT	ITÁLIA/PROVÍNCIA DE TRENTO	TURISMO - ESPORTE - ARQUITETURA - ECONOMIA - IND.
RS	SÃO LOURENÇO DO SUL	PT	ARGENTINA E ALEMANHA	TURISMO E AGRICULTURA
SC	LAGUNA	PT	ITÁLIA - RAVENA	TURISMO - CULTURA - EDUCACAO
SP	GUARULHOS	PT	MOÇAMBIQUE/MAPUTO E MATOLA	RESÍDUOS SÓLIDOS
SP	REGISTRO	PT	JAPÃO/NAKATSUGAWA	CONVENIO DE CIDADE-IRMÃS
SP	SANTO ANTONIO DO PINHAL	PT	ITÁLIA	TURISMO
TO	COLINAS DO TOCANTINS	PT	IRLANDA	SOCIAL
MS	ARAL MOREIRA	PTB	PARAGUAI/CERRO 21	TRANSPORTE ESCOLAR
RO	CABIXI	PTB	BOLÍVIA	SAÚDE
RO	PIMENTEIRAS DO OESTE	PTB	BOLÍVIA	SAÚDE E EDUCAÇÃO
RS	SÃO VENDELINO	PTB	ALEMANHA - CIDADE DE SANNT WENDEL	CULTURAL
SP	SANTO ANDRÉ	PTB	BRAGA/NEUEVA SAN SALVADOR	EDUCAÇÃO/CULTURA/TECNOLOGIA/ESPORTES

Appendix E
Left ModelsTable E1
Models for International Area with Left Treatment

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	International Area			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Left	0.817*** (0.306)	0.898*** (0.332)	0.928*** (0.304)	1.146*** (0.374)
North	0.203 (0.531)			0.087 (0.651)
Northeast	-1.195** (0.498)			-1.143 (0.751)
Midwest	-0.199 (0.680)			-0.213 (0.743)
Southeast	-0.695* (0.394)			-0.919* (0.479)
South				
Urban Population	2.196* (1.308)			1.723 (1.466)
Border Area	1.011** (0.416)			0.451 (0.477)
Population (log)	1.084*** (0.146)			0.514** (0.202)
Network		4.613*** (0.316)		2.995*** (0.371)
Win Margin		2.001** (0.932)		0.841 (1.060)
Per capita GDP (log)			1.058*** (0.208)	0.735** (0.305)
Own resources			10.032*** (2.207)	6.639* (3.531)
Gini			6.792*** (0.913)	0.318 (1.633)
Constant	-16.756*** (1.328)	-5.187*** (0.356)	-13.464*** (1.454)	-16.752*** (2.320)
Observations	2,028	2,028	2,028	2,028
Log Likelihood	-195.126	-186.722	-211.881	-151.000
Akaike Inf. Crit.	408.252	381.444	433.762	330.001

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table E2
Models for International Activities with Left Treatment

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
		International Activities		
	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Left	0.557** (0.233)	0.603** (0.253)	0.625*** (0.230)	0.677** (0.269)
North	-0.240 (0.437)			-0.012 (0.543)
Northeast	-1.156*** (0.371)			-0.645 (0.544)
Midwest	-0.272 (0.529)			-0.200 (0.579)
Southeast	-0.723** (0.314)			-0.758** (0.373)
South				
Urban Population	1.347 (0.875)			0.792 (0.968)
Border Area	0.640* (0.336)			0.265 (0.383)
Population (log)	0.937*** (0.112)			0.434*** (0.150)
Network		4.377*** (0.295)		2.978*** (0.340)
Win Margin		2.362*** (0.710)		1.576** (0.798)
Per capita GDP (log)			0.725*** (0.171)	0.281 (0.246)
Own resources			5.873*** (1.770)	1.402 (2.764)
Gini			6.585*** (0.767)	2.006 (1.230)
Constant	-13.485*** (0.957)	-4.280*** (0.259)	-9.425*** (1.117)	-10.486*** (1.602)
Observations	2,028	2,028	2,028	2,028
Log Likelihood	-306.561	-294.791	-325.608	-257.012
Akaike Inf. Crit.	631.123	597.582	661.216	542.023

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table F1
Models for International Area with PT Treatment

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	International Area				
	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)
Left	0.119 (0.325)	-0.025 (0.374)	-0.299 (0.412)	0.010 (0.360)	-0.356 (0.448)
North		0.546 (0.626)			0.406 (0.801)
Northeast	-0.964** (0.446)	-0.509 (0.659)			-0.709 (1.019)
Midwest		-0.403 (0.847)			-0.229 (0.897)
Southeast		-0.702 (0.501)			-0.926 (0.614)
South					
Urban Population		3.943** (1.709)			3.725* (1.988)
Border Area		1.537*** (0.537)			0.786 (0.609)
Population (log)		0.887*** (0.179)			0.318 (0.251)
Network			4.267*** (0.422)		3.000*** (0.486)
Win Margin			2.483** (1.193)		0.880 (1.345)
Per capita GDP (log)				0.979*** (0.277)	0.583 (0.409)
Own resources				9.780*** (2.736)	6.536 (4.683)
Gini				6.167*** (1.239)	0.656 (2.036)
Constant	-2.684*** (0.276)	-15.368*** (1.714)	-3.899*** (0.405)	-11.824*** (1.805)	-14.583*** (3.013)
Observations	802	802	802	802	802
Log Likelihood	-173.114	-116.672	-112.806	-130.552	-91.063
Akaike Inf. Crit.	352.228	251.344	233.612	271.104	210.125

Note:

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Table F2
Models for International Activities with PT Treatment

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	International Activities				
	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
Left	0.057 (0.270)	-0.074 (0.303)	-0.263 (0.330)	-0.028 (0.297)	-0.313 (0.355)
North		0.188 (0.511)			0.070 (0.675)
Northeast	-1.115*** (0.386)	-0.875 (0.538)			-0.944 (0.804)
Midwest		-0.127 (0.622)			-0.211 (0.679)
Southeast		-0.569 (0.407)			-0.774 (0.496)
South					
Urban Population		2.369** (1.130)			2.103* (1.275)
Border Area		1.151*** (0.427)			0.439 (0.487)
Population (log)		0.773*** (0.140)			0.116 (0.193)
Network			4.248*** (0.432)		3.303*** (0.500)
Win Margin			3.649*** (0.937)		2.824*** (1.096)
Per capita GDP (log)				0.626*** (0.236)	0.033 (0.349)
Own resources				6.770*** (2.286)	4.698 (3.710)
Gini				6.681*** (1.086)	3.328** (1.567)
Constant	-2.199*** (0.227)	-12.040*** (1.231)	-3.488*** (0.327)	-8.765*** (1.464)	-8.659*** (2.241)
Observations	802	802	802	802	802
Log Likelihood	-227.395	-172.305	-159.310	-181.477	-137.849
Akaike Inf. Crit.	460.790	362.611	326.620	372.955	303.699

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table G1
Odds-Ratio for Regression Models

Model	Odds-Ratio	95% Confidence Interval	
		Lower Value	Higher Value
1	2.26	1.26	4.21
2	2.45	1.30	4.82
3	2.53	1.42	4.70
4	3.14	1.55	6.78
5	1.74	1.11	2.78
6	1.83	1.12	3.04
7	1.87	1.20	2.96
8	1.97	1.17	3.39
9	1.13	0.60	2.18
10	0.98	0.47	2.07
11	0.74	0.33	1.68
12	1.01	0.50	2.09
13	0.70	0.29	1.70
14	1.06	0.63	1.82
15	0.93	0.52	1.70
16	0.77	0.40	1.48
17	0.97	0.55	1.76
18	0.73	0.36	1.48